

[38]

EXHIBIT B

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY
OF WAR

SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

1. Statement of interview of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, 24 January 1945, at Washington, D. C.
2. Proposed affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
3. Affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, 13 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
4. Affidavit of Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, 13 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
5. Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, 20 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
6. Affidavit of Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, AC, 22 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
7. Affidavit of Margaret McKenney, GSC, G-2, 22 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
8. Affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 25 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
9. Amendment to affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 14 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
10. Affidavit of Major Edward B. Anderson, TC, 27 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
11. Affidavit of Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop, AGO, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
12. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
13. Affidavit of Major General Ralph C. Smith, GSC, G-2, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C.
14. Affidavit of Mary L. Ross, GSC, G-2, 1 March 1945, at Washington, D. C.
15. Affidavit of Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, Virginia.
16. Affidavit of General Charles K. Gailey, OPD, GSC, 21 March 1945, at Washington, D. C.
17. Affidavit of Colonel Edward F. French, SC, 22 March 1945, at Washington, D. C.
- [39] 18. Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, GSC, 22 March 1945, at Washington, D. C.
19. Statement of Mr. John E. Russell, President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H., 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H., also statement of Harry L. Dawson, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
20. Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
21. Statement of Lt. Colonel Byron M. Meurlott, MI, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
22. Statement of Colonel O. N. Thompson, AGO, 17 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
23. Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN, and Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN, 18 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
24. Affidavit of Brig. General Morrill W. Marston, GSC, 21 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
25. Affidavit of Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane, USN 21 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
26. Statement of Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr. USN, 22 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
27. Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, 26 April 1945, at Guam.
28. Statement of Brig. General C. A. Powell, SC, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
29. Statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.

30. Affidavit of Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
31. Affidavit of Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland, C/S, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas, 6 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
32. Affidavit of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 7 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
33. Affidavit of Major General C. A. Willoughby, ACS, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas, 8 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
34. Affidavit of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, GSC, 11 May 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
35. Affidavit of Brig. General Thomas J. Betts, ACS, GSC, 13 June 1945, at Frankfurt on Main, Germany.
36. Affidavit of Lt. General Walter B. Smith, C/S, SHAEF, 15 June 1945, at Frankfurt on Main, Germany.
- [40] 37. Affidavit of Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow, CG, 15th Army, 20 June 1945, at Cannes, France.
38. Affidavit of Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, 2 June 1945, at Casserta, Italy.
39. Affidavit of George W. Renchard, 7 July 1945, at London, England.
40. Affidavit of John F. Stone, 7 July 1945, at London, England.
41. Affidavit of Major General John R. Deane, USA, 24 July 1945, at Potsdam, Germany.
42. Affidavit of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, 27 July 1945, at Paris, France.
43. Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
44. Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron, GSC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
45. Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles, USA, 16 August 1945, at Boston, Massachusetts.
46. Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, 21 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
47. Affidavit of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, 28 August 1945, at Washington, D. C.
48. Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doud, SC, 10 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
49. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
50. Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
51. Affidavit of Miss Mary J. Dunning, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.
52. Affidavit of Miss Louise Prather, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C.

[41]

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington 25, D. C., 24 January 1945.

Memorandum for the files.

Subject: Interview of General Fielder.

Pursuant to a telephone call by me to General Fielder through General Bissell on 8 January 1945, I interviewed General Fielder at Room 4D852, Pentagon, on 9 January 1945. I explained to General Fielder my mission and the clearances with General Bissell which permitted General Fielder to answer all my questions fully and freely. I reminded him that he was already sworn as a witness for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the necessity for secrecy with respect to my examination. To many of my questions he answered that it would be necessary for me to review the records at Hawaii and that this would entail considerable research. He gave the following information or answers to the specific points indicated.

1. Concerning his message to G-2 not to furnish intelligence from Washington since it was a duplication (Bratton D. 292-293), he stated that he referred solely to counterintelligence matters and that had "nothing to do with combat."

2. He stated he was not very well acquainted with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and that he had maintained no liaison with him. He said he did not know of any liaison arrangements between Commander Rochefort and Colonel Edward Riley. [Written:] Said he had no knowledge of "U" (called R1.)

3. Upon having his attention invited to his G-2 estimate of 17 and 25 October 1941, he stated it was his understanding that these were circulated to the Chief of Staff and General Short.

4. He said he thought he had talked with General Short concerning the Washington G-2, 27 November 1941, warning.

5. He claimed that he did not see the Navy Intelligence Bulletin of 1 December 1941.

6. He recalled the Black Dragon Society, Washington G-2 information (Bratton D. 289-291) and that it was "circulated" as something he "used to get."

7. He claimed he did not see the Melbourne, Australia, Military Attache message of 5-6 December 1941.

[42] 8. He stated that General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long distance reconnaissance.

9. Concerning the 5 December 1941, Washington G-2 message to the Hawaiian Department G-2 to contact Commander Rochefort regarding the Winds Message, he said he "didn't remember" the message but that it "might have come in as routine."

10. With respect to the subject matter of the message and whether he knew that the Navy was intercepting such information, he stated at first that he knew of this work but that it was talked about in whispers and that on this basis he knew the Navy had broken Japanese codes.

Additional questions concerning other subjects relating to the inquiry were asked.

General Fielder stated that accurate information could not be given without recourse to the records in Hawaii. A similar qualification already referred to obtains in part concerning the foregoing answers and information.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

H. C. C.,

Major, JAGD,

Assistant Recorder, APHB.

TOP SECRET

[43] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state:

During the period from the fall of 1941 to December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily radio intelligence under assignments from the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer. My unit consisted of an intercept station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor.

My opposite number in the Army at Pearl Harbor was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. In the fall of 1941 arrangements were made between Colonel Fielder and myself for liaison and exchange of intelligence information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters, and with him and Edwin T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, at my headquarters. Thereafter, including the period to 7 December 1941, we maintained most cordial and close relations, meeting informally and frequently, and carried out these arrangements.

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. I knew, however, that this was then being done mainly by joint efforts of the Army and other units of the Navy. On occasions I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It

was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and [44] and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests.

[Written:] Note.—This proposed affidavit was prepared by me in accordance with statements to me and Comdr. Sonnett by Capt. Rochefort.

Following are examples of such intelligence. My recollection in this regard is distinct because I had been given special assignments concerning these items of intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shivers, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington.

JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT,
Captain, USN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of February 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

TOP SECRET

[45]

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL MOSES W. PETTIGREW, MIS

Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his rights to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says:

From August to 7 December 1941 he was executive officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington; that from November 1939 to August 1941 he was assistant to Colonel Rufus W. Bratton in the Far Eastern Unit, G-2, War Department;

That while performing said duties in G-2, he read various intercepts of diplomatic radio messages from Japan to consulates and embassies; that these intercepts were variously classified as Purple, High Level Diplomatic, and J19;

That he recalls reading, on or about 26 November 1941 and 28 November 1941, while in the performance of his said duties, two intercepts, SIS No. 25392 and SIS No. 25432, copies of which shown him this date by Major Clausen have been identified by affiant with his initials and date, and which are now commonly referred to as the "Winds Code";

That someone whom affiant does not now recall, showed affiant on or about 5 December 1941, an implementation intercept which had been received from the Navy and which indicated that Japanese-U. S. relations were in danger; that in view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the implementation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had prepared for dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he does not now recall, a secret cablegram, a copy of which is attached.

That affiant was of the belief then that the Hawaiian Department was in possession of the same information he had received in Washington; that he reached this conclusion by statements therefore of Naval personnel, whom he does not now recall, to the effect that Hawaii had everything in the way of information that Washington had; and, that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii under Commander Rochefort which was monitoring and receiving these intercepts and breaking and translating the codes, as well as Washington, in the

interest of saving time, utilizing personnel there available, and a subsequent exchange of intercept translations as a check one against the another.

[46] That on 5 December 1941 affiant believed that the Army in Hawaii would receive this information from the Navy there but he sent the secret telegram of 5 December 1941 as a precautionary measure since he felt it might have been possible that the Army in Hawaii did not get the same information; that affiant has looked at the file copy of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram he prepared and has affixed his initials and date on the reverse side thereof; that the initials "RSB" written thereon in the upper right-hand corner, indicating Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, were written thereon by affiant on 5 December 1941 and affiant also wrote his own initials in the upper right-hand corner; that affiant believes he took the message when it had been prepared to the office of Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Office, G-2, had the message initialed by Lt. Colonel C. H. Edmonston, and then took it to the G-2 Cable Room for dispatch;

That the number 519 on said message indicates to affiant that the message was dispatched on 5 December 1941 because such was an outgoing message number which was given only in the ordinary course of procedure when a message was dispatched;

Affiant does not know what if anything happened after the dispatch of said message with reference to action thereon by the Hawaiian Department;

That prior to affiant's aforesaid duties in G-2, War Department, he was from May 1939 to October 1939, G-2 of the Hawaiian Department; that while in the performance of said duties of G-2, Hawaiian Department, he had been informed that the Navy there had a crypto-analytic unit to that time; that the Army had a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the development of this phase of intelligence; that it was possible on occasions to obtain certain information from a commercial cable company; that Colonel Morrill W. Marston succeeded affiant as G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in turn was succeeded by Colonel Fielder;

Affiant recommends as leads to be pursued by Major Clausen, an interview with Miss Margaret McKenney, Room 2D841, Pentagon, Extension 5851, questioning of personnel in the War Department Message Center, and interviews and checking records at Hawaii in possession of the Signal Corps there, especially Colonel Powell. Also, interviews with Colonel C. C. Duisenbury, MID, former assistant to Colonel Bratton and with General Marston.

Moses W. Pettigrew,
MOSES W. PETTIGREW,
Colonel, MIS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

SECRET

[47] Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
March 10, 1926

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

Sent No. 519, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2, Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES.

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G-2.

Secret Cablegram
las

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington.

[49]

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL CARLISE CLYDE DUSENBURY, GSC

Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, Assistant Director of Intelligence, Southeast Asia Command, Kandy, Ceylon, on temporary duty in Washington, being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his right to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says:

To the best of my recollection I prepared the initial draft of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram reading:

"Sent No. 519, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES."

I have identified a copy of this cablegram by my initials and date on the reverse side thereof. This was prepared either of my volition or following consultation with Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, G-2, Chief, Far Eastern Branch, MIS. For several months prior to and following 7 December 1941 Colonel Pettigrew was on duty as Executive Officer, Intelligence Group, MID, and was not an active member of the Far Eastern Section when the message of 5 December originated. His duties were administrative and consisted in part of redrafting and approving outgoing messages. The reason which I recollect for sending the secret cablegram was that the trend of translated intercepts which had been received by G-2, especially the "Winds Code", indicated danger to the United States and also, because there was believed to be lack of confidence by Edwin T. Layton, Navy Intelligence Officer as to Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department.

It was believed by me that Commander Rochefort had these intercepts, including the "Winds Code" and similar information, available at Hawaii, which had been received either at Hawaii or from the Navy Department in Washington. I understood the Navy had about four or five hundred Naval personnel in Hawaii doing monitoring, breaking, and translating of the Japanese diplomatic codes.

[50] During the time in question I was assistant to Colonel Bratton, having reported to him in August 1940, and continued as his assistant until and after 7 December 1941. For the four or five months immediately following August 1940, Colonel Bratton received from the Signal Corps the translated intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages and delivered certain of these to Colonel Harrison, Aide of the Secretary of War; John Stone, secretary to Secretary of State Hull; Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Colonel Bedell Smith and Colonel Thomas T. Handy or Colonel Bundy in OPD. The procedure followed by Colonel Bratton and myself as his assistant was to destroy all copies of the translated intercepts received except such as were thus distributed, and those distributed were inserted in binders and delivered to the recipients who receipted for them. These receipts and the intercepts which were covered thereby were then later returned to Colonel Bratton or myself as the case might be and the receipts and the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the intercepts which was retained by G-2. At the expiration of the four or five months period referred to following August 1940, Colonel Bratton and I alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued this practice until about 7 December 1941, although towards the end of this period I handled the sorting and delivering almost exclusively. No record is now available in G-2 to my knowledge of the messages which were thus sorted and delivered, and none was kept because of the top secrecy requirements. While I cannot recollect specifically each message which I delivered I believe that this information can be obtained elsewhere than in the War Department. For example, the State Department may have briefed and recorded the intercepts. Normally, we would receive daily about fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts which would be sorted to about twenty-five for distribution.

I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen parts and I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State. When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me "This means war," or words to that effect. None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941 because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night; furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate hostilities.

It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received by the Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof were known to the Navy prior to receipt by the Army.

[51] I recollect that the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by G-2 the morning of 7 December 1941. It is my impression that it was received by Colonel Bratton after he arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a. m.

Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury,
CARLISLE CLYDE DUSENBURY,
Colonel, G. S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

TOP SECRET

[52] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state:

During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily the acquisition of intelligence as directed by the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer.

My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area, was, prior to December 1941, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Prior to and during December 1941, we had established and maintained liaison for the purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor. During the fall and including the period up to 7 December 1941, we maintained more cordial and close relations, meeting informally.

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. On occasions, however, I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have

written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests.

[53] Following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shiver, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington.

Joseph J. Rochefort,
JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[54] AFFIDAVIT OF CLARENCE G. JENSEN, COLONEL, AIR CORPS, AUS

Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Air Corps (O475864), presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M. & S., Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

That during the period from 14 August to 1 October, 1944, pursuant to instructions, I made diligent search of all War Department pertinent files, and especially those in the possession of Operational Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and its predecessor, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, covering the period 1 July, 1941, to 7 December, 1941, to ascertain whether a Standing Operating Procedure, dated 5 November 1941, of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had been received in the War Department before 7 December, 1941; that among other things I personally searched or supervised a search of the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division and the Army Air Forces, and inquired of those likely to have direct or indirect knowledge of the said Standing Operating Procedure, including Major General L. S. Kuter, Air Corps, Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, Office of The Adjutant General, and Miss Alice Miller, civilian in charge of the Registered Document Section of Operational Plans Division, WDGS; that this search indicated that no such Standing Operating Procedure was received by the War Department at Washington, D. C., until March of 1942; that I questioned General Dunlop as to whether he remembered having sent in the Standing Operating Procedure from Hawaii, he having been Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department for some months immediately prior to 7 December 1941, and he stated that he had no recollection on the subject; that I also questioned General Kuter, who, by reason of his assignment and duties in Washington with respect to the Air Corps and the War Plans Division, WDGS, during the months immediately preceding 7 December, 1941, would have been likely to remember, whether he had any recollection and he stated he did not; that the net result of my search, therefore, indicated that a copy of the said Standing Operating Procedure was first received at Washington, D. C., in March, 1942, at the time it was receipted for in accordance with the attached photostatic copy of receipt; that the reference in said receipt to OHD-41 is to a bound volume, Register No. 45, Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941, which contains Standing Operat-

ing Procedure Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941, and identifies said Standing Operating Procedure as superseding Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 14 July, 1941; that a letter dated 5 November 1941, attached to said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 1941, directs the collection and destruction of all copies of the said Tentative Standing Operating Procedure; that said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 1941, provides, among other things, in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Section II, as follows:

[55] "13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 (8) below.

"14. *ALERT NO. 1.*—*a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands, with no threat from without.

* * * * *

"15. *ALERT NO. 2.*—*a.* This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

* * * * *

16. *ALERT NO. 3.*—*a.* This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

* * * * *

Signed: CLARENCE G. JENSEN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

SECRET

[56]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 January 1942.

In reply refer to:
AG 311.5—OHD-41.

WPD-381—Haw Dept (1-29-42)
Auth: CG, Haw Dept
Initials OMM A. G.
Date: 29 Jan 1942

Subject: Operation Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941.
To: War Plans Division, War Department General Staff,
Washington, D. C.

Herewith Register Nos 45 of Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941.
Request acknowledgment of receipt by signature below.

By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:

O. M. McDole,
O. M. MCDOLE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Incls: Received Registers Nos. 45 of OHD-41.
March 10, 1942.

J. L. McKee,
J. L. MCKEE,
Col., G. S. C.

TOP SECRET

[57]

AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET MCKENNEY

Margaret McKenney, civilian clerk in charge, Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a civilian clerk in charge of the Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff,

G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., which section collects and delivers incoming and outgoing cables pertaining to the office; that I have read the affidavit of Mary L. Ross and the facts therein set forth appear to my best information and belief to be accurate; that from my experience and knowledge of the customary practice during December, 1941, I believe the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram from General Miles to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, was sent because (1) the yellow copy of the cablegram, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross was returned in the condition as shown on said copy only if the message was sent, (2) the notations of the number 519 thereon indicates that the message was assigned a number by the Signal Corps code room when it was received from G-2; that the message was then encoded and sent and that then the notation "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" was placed thereon, (3) that the stamp on the reverse side of copy of said yellow copy attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew indicates that it was received in the code room of the Signal Corps at 11:47 a. m. on 5 December 1941, (4) that the numeral "4" in the lower left-hand corner of said cablegram indicates that it is the fourth message that went from G-2 that day and as typed into the outgoing cables receipt book, the page of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, (5) that the said G-2 receipt book, 5 December 1941, shows the outgoing cable messages for that day and that with respect to the cable in question the customary procedure was followed; that in accordance with this procedure the daily serial number 4 of the message was typewritten on said page with the designation, classification, time received in the Cable Section, number 32 being Mary L. Ross as the clerk sending it out, the initials of the originating officer and the paraphrase of the subject matter of the message; the page from the receipt book shows that the message was receipted for in the Signal Corps code room by a clerk using the initials "DG", and that written on the page of the receipt book is the number 519, being the number assigned the message by the Signal Corps under a system to indicate that the message was sent and received by the addressee; (6) that the system indicated by the number 519 tied in with a system of the Signal Corps so that the Hawaiian Department in receiving messages must account for the sequence by numbers and if a number were missing would check back with Washington to locate the missing message; that since no check backs were received with respect to number 519, the system shows that the message was received by the addressee in Hawaii, and (7) that I have also seen the buck-slip, a photostatic copy [58] of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, and on which at the bottom is the handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I assisted in the collection of the pertinent documents bearing on the foregoing facts prior to Pearl Harbor and at subsequent intervals and for that reason my memory is clear on the points in which I herein state I have knowledge.

Signed: MARGARET McKENNEY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN.

Major, J. A. G. D.

at Washington, D. C.

⁴
TOP SECRET

[59]

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, 25 February 1945.

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL, M. I.

Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I., presently assigned to G-2, MIS, Washington, D. C., having been duly sworn and informed of the investigation of Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and informed that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counterintelligence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate chief was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder. Prior to this service I had training in G-2 work, and in this connection had served under General Nolan.

Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed sources of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in Honolulu whose offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor; the District Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the 14th Naval District; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific Fleet; the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army. Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the FBI. I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding this date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. I caused other sources of information to be available to me such as the FCC intercept radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the public press, and certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands.

Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that when a false weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a signal to know that war or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Britain, or one or more of these three, and to destroy their secret codes and papers. The intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have initialed, contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part of November, 1941. I took immediate action to have the local FCC intercept radio station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later furnished me certain intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which were not the ones for which I was looking.

[60] Later, my attention was again called to this "Winds" code information when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my recollection on 5 December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder's desk a message from the War Department, Washington, D. C., in substance as follows:

"DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2, *Hawaiian Department,*
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

MILES."

On the day I saw this message I communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was monitoring for the execution message of the "Winds" code. This information was also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers, then FBI Agent In Charge, Honolulu. The information they had as to the "Winds" code was the same as that which had been given me.

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on Page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere. I had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which were mimeographed and distributed to the Chief of Staff; G-2, Hawaiian Department; G-2, Hawaiian Air Force; G-2, Schofield Barracks; G-3, Hawaiian Department; FBI, Honolulu; and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of which are set forth

between pages 3684 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources I have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of conveying the pertinent information to interested parties.

In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent then living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly was connected with [61] some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the conversation had been recorded and translated, a copy of which was given me. Mr. Shivers was alarmed at what he considered the military implications in this message concerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his views and considered the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. I recall that the subjects of discussion between the Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the party in Tokyo as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions, and references to "hibiskus" and "poinsettias." My G-2 sense told me that there was something very significant about the message. I know the intricacy and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies sometimes adopt very innocuous means of transmitting military information, and I had in mind the other items of intelligence I had received, including my prior estimates. I reasoned, also, at the time that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu was ostensibly going by radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted elsewhere. I also considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the information I had received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take in execution of the "Winds" code.

I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5:15 p. m., 6 December 1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come and see him and General Short immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and General Short were going to dinner at Schofield Barracks and since they were all ready to go the matter had better wait until tomorrow. I stated that I thought it was too important to wait and that I had to see them right away. I was then told that if I could get out there in ten minutes they would wait for me. I did rush out and make it in ten minutes and handed the intercepted message to General Short who read it with Colonel Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.

Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong."

On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I caused all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of Japanese agents for which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I caused, also, a search to be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers seized, some of which he did not have time to destroy, and I had these turned over to Commander Rochefort for our joint investigatory action.

As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision and custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr. Jack Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned concerning the warning [62] to Short supposed to have been sent on 6 December 1941 by the British SIS, Manila; and that in this connection then Lt. Colonel Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of British SIS, be questioned.

George W. Bicknell,
GEORGE W. BICKNELL.
Colonel, M. I.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[63] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL

Colonel George W. Bicknell, heretofore examined by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, makes the following amendment to his affidavit of 25 February 1945, concerning the Pearl Harbor investigation:

I wish to state further that prior to 7 December 1941, namely about October 1941, I made and practised, in collaboration with Mr. Shivers of the FBI, elaborate plans for rounding up dangerous aliens, especially Japanese, in the event of war with Japan. These plans were divided into three categories, called "A", "B" and "C". They are specifically set forth in memoranda I prepared which should be in the G-2 and FBI files. Plan "C" was put into execution immediately on the proclamation of martial law.

In connection with such plans I wish also to refer to my written estimates given to General Short and his Staff, including those dated 17 and 25 October 1941. In view of the impending events, I also, on about the middle of October, 1941, recommended to the Hawaiian Department G-2 and Signal Officer that a teletype system be installed which would link all the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian Islands with the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file containing many of the reports which Gerald Wilkinson of the British Secret Intelligence Service sent to Mr. Harry Dawson in Honolulu. Those in this file which are marked for me, were received by me on or about the dates set forth on the documents. Included in this group are the two documents, dated as having been received at Honolulu 27 November and 3 December, 1941, and in turn delivered to the FBI at Honolulu on 29 November and 4 December, 1941, respectively, and which documents were received by me on the dates they were delivered to the FBI. I have identified a copy of each document by putting my initials and today's date on the reverse sides.

The information which was thus received from Gerald Wilkinson, including that set forth on the two documents stated of 27 November and 3 December, 1941, as well as any pertinent information I received in connection with my G-2 activities, I gave to General Short, promptly, in one form or another. Reference is made in this regard to the files of written memoranda which should be available in the G-2 offices at Honolulu and Washington, to my testimony heretofore on the subject, and to my personal conference with General Short on 6 December 1941.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of August, 1945

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[64]

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR EDWARD B. ANDERSON, T. C.

Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C., presently on duty with the Office of the Transportation Corps, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

My attention has been called to a photostatic copy of a secret telegram dated 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. On the date of this message I was assigned to the Office of The Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department. My immediate superior was the then Major McDole. The customary and usual practice with respect to such messages was for them to be sent from the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, to the office in which I was assigned, Office of The Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, and by our office to the addressee. Normally the Signal Officer sent two copies to our office. One of these was sent by our office to the action addressee, and if it was returned it was filed in a subject file. The other copy was retained in our office and used for the purpose of checking against the sequence of numbers which was a system in use at the time for assuring that we received all

messages. If a number was missing we would check back with the Signal Office and ascertain the reason why. I cannot recall specifically having seen the message in question dated 5 December 1941, but I do not recall either having occasion at the time to have indications of a missing number.

As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel McDole, Chief Warrant Officer Lane, Warrant Officer Knapp, and personnel of the Signal Office, Hawaiian Department. The records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Office, Hawaiian Department, should indicate whether the message was received.

Edward B. Anderson,
EDWARD B. ANDERSON,
Major, T. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT H. DUNLOP

Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, presently assigned to the Office of The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

I was Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department from June 1941 to and including December 1941 and thereafter.

I recall the all-out alert which was ordered by General Herron in 1940. So far as I observed, this alert and the action of the Army in pursuance thereof did not materially alarm the civilian population.

My attention has been invited to the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department dated 5 November 1941, a copy of which Major Clausen has shown me, contained in a bound volume, register No. 45, Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1941, which also contains a copy of a letter dated 5 November 1941, over my signature. I have no recollection of sending any copy of the Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November 1941, or the Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1941, to Washington, D. C., or having these sent to Washington, D. C., before 7 December 1941.

On 27 November 1941, I was in the office of Lt. General Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, when Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, at about 2:30 p. m. entered the room, excused himself for the interruption, and said that he had come in to show the Commanding General a very important message from General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C., which he had just received. General Short read this message and said in effect that it certainly was a very important message, and, it is my impression that, directing himself to Colonel Phillips told him to put into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941. At that time the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941 was in effect for the Hawaiian Department. I ascertained then or later that the message from Washington read in general as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be constructed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and [66] other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

At 4 p. m. the afternoon of 27 November 1941 I was present at the staff meeting to which I had been called. The message was read to us and Colonel Phillips stated that the Commanding General had ordered into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure. He asked for questions and as I recollect there was only one question put. It concerned the message from General Marshall, but the details of which I cannot now recall. There was no further discussion. There was no mention then or thereafter, to my knowledge up to 7 December 1941; as to what had been the effect upon the civilian population of the alert ordered by General Herron the preceding year to which I have referred. The staff meeting did not last longer than about fifteen minutes.

I have no recollection of having seen the message dated 5 December 1941, the one showed me by Major Clausen, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, but I suggest that a search of the records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, be made since the receipt or non-receipt should have been recorded and the record thereof preserved.

Robert H. Dunlop,
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Brigadier General.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[67]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 28 February 1945.

AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, S. C.

Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, Signal Corps, presently Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, OCSigO, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941 and during the immediately preceding month, I was a civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-Analytical Unit Signal Intelligence Service, OCSigO, War Department, Washington, D. C. My immediate superior was Major Harold S. Doud who was assistant to Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Chief of the Signal Intelligence Service, who in turn was under Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Chief of the Army Communications Service, and whose superior was the Chief Signal Officer. Colonel Eric Svensson was in charge of the Japanese Diplomatic Solution Activities.

I recall in general the tenor of the various Japanese diplomatic intercepts which had been deciphered and translated, contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen. Pursuant to the request of Major Clausen I have attempted to compile from original records presently in the possession of the Signal Corps information concerning the intercepts in said Exhibit "B" as to (1) sources of interception; (2) dates of the messages; (3) dates of interception; (4) dates of translations; (5) whether Honolulu had copies; (6) whether the activating message in pursuance of the "Winds" code message is available in places to which I now have access. Attached hereto is a summary I prepared which refers to various of the intercepts by the Signal Intelligence Service number and gives some of the requested information which I have been able to obtain. My search has not disclosed any "Winds" code activating message, although at the time it was supposed to have been intercepted shortly before 7 December 1941. I recall comments to the effect that it had been intercepted.

As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel Doud, Colonel Minckler, Colonel Sadtler, Colonel Svensson, Miss Prather, and Mr. Friedman, among others.

Frank B. Rowlett,
FRANK B. ROWLETT,
Lt. Col., S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[68]	SIS No.	Sources*	Date Msg	Date Int	Date translated	Honolulu
23260	-----	S	24 Sept	24 Sept	9 Oct	No
23570	-----	7	14 Oct	15 Oct	16 Oct	No
23516	-----	2, S, 7, M, 3	14 Oct	14 Oct	15 Oct	No
23631	-----	1	16 Oct	16 Oct	17 Oct	No
23859	-----	2, 7, 1	22 Oct	22/23 Oct	23 Oct	No
24373	-----	S (teletype)	5 Nov	5 Nov	5 Nov	No
25322	-----	Navy Radio	14 Nov	?	26 Nov	No
25644	-----	S	15 Nov	?	7 Dec	No
24878	-----	S	16 Nov	17 Nov	17 Nov	No
25773	-----	S	18 Nov	18 Nov	5 Dec	No
25817	-----	1, 2	18 Nov	18/19 Nov	6 Dec	No
25392	-----	S	19 Nov	?	26 Nov	No
25823	-----	S, 2	29 Nov	?	5 Dec	No
25040	-----	S (teletype)	19 Nov	?	20 Nov	No
25432	-----	S (teletype)	19 Nov	?	28 Nov	No
25138	-----	S	22 Nov	22 Nov	22 Nov	No
25135	-----	1, 6	26 Nov	26 Nov	28 Nov	No
25344	-----	S	26 Nov	26 Nov	26 Nov	No
25349	-----	?	26 Nov	26 Nov	26 Nov	No
25444	-----	1, 2	26 Nov	27 Nov	28 Nov	No
25480	-----	1, 2	26 Nov	26/27 Nov	29 Nov	No
25436	-----	1	26 Nov	26 Nov	28 Nov	No
25445	-----	S, 6	28 Nov	28 Nov	28 Nov	No
25496	-----	S (teletype)	29 Nov	29 Nov	30 Nov	No
25554	-----	Navy Radio	30 Nov	30 Nov	1 Dec	No
25553	-----	J, Navy Rad	30 Nov	1 Dec	1 Dec	No
25552	-----	J, Navy Rad	30 Nov	1 Dec	1 Dec	No
25497	-----	?	30 Nov	30 Nov	30 Nov	No
25555	-----	Navy Radio	30 Nov	30 Nov	1 Dec	No
25787	-----	British	1 Dec	?	5 Dec	No
25605	-----	S (teletype)	1 Dec	1 Dec	1 Dec	No
25545	-----	S (teletype)	1 Dec	1 Dec	1 Dec	No
25727	-----	S, 1	1 Dec	?	4 Dec	No
25783	-----	S, Navy Radio	1 Dec	?	4 Dec	No
25659-B	-----	1, 2, 7	2 Dec	2 Dec	3 Dec	No
25660	-----	7	2 Dec	2 Dec	3 Dec	No
25649	-----	X, 2	2 Dec	2 Dec	3 Dec	No
25785	-----	7	3 Dec	?	5 Dec	No
25807	-----	W	4 Dec	5 Dec	5 Dec	No
27065	-----	S, 5	2 Dec	2 Dec	30 Dec	Yes
25843	-----	S (teletype)	4 Dec	?	7 Dec	No
25836	-----	S (teletype)	5 Dec	?	6 Dec	No
25838	-----	S	6 Dec	6 Dec	6 Dec	No
25843	-----	S	6 Dec	6 Dec	6 Dec	No
26158	-----	1, 5	6 Dec	?	12 Dec	Yes
25846	-----	2 (teletype)	6 Dec	6 Dec	7 Dec	No
25854	-----	S	7 Dec	7 Dec	7 Dec	No
25850	-----	S	7 Dec	7 Dec	7 Dec	No
25856	-----	S (teletype)	7 Dec	7 Dec	7 Dec	No
25866	-----	2, Navy Rad	7 Dec	7 Dec	7 Dec	No

*Navy: J=Jupiter, Fla. S=Bainbridge Island, Wash. W=Winter Harbor, Me. Navy Radio-Navy Overseas Intercept or British, X-photographs of original messages

Army: 1=Ft. Hancock, 2=San Francisco, 3=San Antonio, 4=Panama, 5=Honolulu, 6=Manila, 7=Fort Hunt, Va.

[69]

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL RALPH C. SMITH

Major General Ralph C. Smith, presently on duty in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, I was Executive Officer in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, D. C. Several months immediately before 7 December 1941, Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury was assistant to Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Branch, G-2. Up to a few weeks before 7 December 1941, it was customary for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury to bring to me, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Japanese diplomatic messages which had been intercepted, deciphered, and translated, in a locked pouch to which I had a key. During this time I would open the pouch, glance over the intercepts and then give them to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. A few weeks before 7 December 1941, pursuant to instructions I relinquished my key to the pouch, gave it to the Assistant Chief

of Staff, G-2, General Miles. Thereafter, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury would bring me the locked pouches but I then did not read the intercepts and gave the locked pouches directly to General Miles. During the period when I was reading the intercepts, or handed the locked pouch to General Miles, as stated, the pouches containing the intercepts were almost always delivered to me by Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recollect specifically whether Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury alternated in bringing me the pouches, I do recall clearly that as a customary practice it was either one, or the other.

I did not receive any such intercepts or pouches after about noon on 6 December 1941. This is clearly fixed in my mind because I entrained at about 6 p. m., for Fort Benning preparatory to a refresher course at the Infantry School which I then commenced. I recall as being on the train with me en route to Fort Benning, the evening of 6 December 1941, Colonel C. R. Huebner. I did not, therefore, following the time stated, namely about noon on 6 December 1941, receive any pouch containing intercepts or any intercepts for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or any other person.

Ralph C. Smith.
RALPH C. SMITH,
Major General.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

Washington, D. C.

[70]

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY L. ROSS

Mary L. Ross, presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J.A.G.D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a clerk in the Cable Branch in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington; that in said month of December, 1941, in connection with my duties I was assigned the number "32" and said number was used in said office to designate me.

That my attention has been called to a secret cablegram dated 5 December 1941 from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, a photostatic copy of which is hereto annexed; that I recall the circumstances and my actions with respect to said cablegram; that the yellow copy of said cablegram, of which the attached exhibit is a photostatic copy, was brought to me with a "buck-slip", a photostatic copy of which is attached, and on which at the bottom is written a message in the handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I recall that the person who brought me the cablegram also orally informed me that the message was important and its immediate dispatch was urgent; that on receiving the yellow copy and said buck-slip I made the customary entry in the office outgoing cables receipt book, a photostatic copy of the pertinent page of which is also attached hereto; that the entry shown therein as Ser. No. 4 was typed therein by myself as indicated by my number 32 in the column for the clerk; that I put a red priority tag on the copy of the cablegram and took it to the Signal Corps code room, handed it to the clerk who receipted for it by the initials "DG" written on the page of said receipt book as is indicated by the attached photostatic copy; that thereafter, probably the next day, the yellow copy was returned with the notation thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5"; that the said number 519 was assigned the message by the Signal Corps and was then written on a page of our receipt book as is indicated on the attached photostatic copy; that the procedure in the Signal Corps code room was to assign a number and then after the message was sent to write on the yellow copy that it was sent as was done on the yellow copy of the message in question as heretofore indicated.

That also attached hereto is a photostatic copy of the paraphrase kept in the G-2 office and which has thereon "MAILED G/2 W.D.G.S. DEC 5 1941 32"; that this latter notation on said photostatic copy was placed thereon by me to

indicate that it had been transmitted by the Signal Corps; that the initials in the lower right hand corner thereof, "RSB WP" are in the handwriting of Colonel Pettigrew.

That my memory with respect to the foregoing is clear because soon [71] after Pearl Harbor and at intervals thereafter I was questioned concerning the foregoing and the Office of G-2 assembled pertinent papers among which were the documents, photostatic copies of which there are attached; that I assisted in the assembly of these papers.

Signed: MARY L. ROSS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 1st day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[72]

Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
March 10, 1926

SECRET

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

Sent No. 519, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,
*Headquarters G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii*

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

MILES

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive Officer, G-2.

Secret Cablegram

[73]

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH—MISV—WDGS

FROM:

TO:

The A. C. of S., G-2
Executive Officer, G-2
Chief, Intelligence Branch
Executive, Intelligence Branch
Administrative
Field Personnel
Drafting and Reproduction
Stenographic Pool
Asst. Chief, Intelligence Branch
Situation
Contact
Dissemination
Air Section
British Empire Section
Central European Section
Eastern European Section
Southern European Section
Western European Section
Far Eastern Section
Latin American Section

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

Military Attache Section
 Foreign Liaison Section
 Coordinating Section
 Finance Section
 Personnel Section
 Record Section
 Translation Section
 Mimeograph Room
 Chief Clerk

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

SPECIAL STUDY GROUP

PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH

INFORMATION CONTROL BRANCH

W. D. MAP COLLECTION

FOR Necessary Action

Preparation of reply
 Recommendation or remark
 Information and guidance
 Note and return
 Number and return

[Written:] Important—Please put priority tag on Re Service Japanese WD

(The page from the receipt book relating to outgoing cables mentioned in the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, *supra*, will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

SECRET

[75] Paraphrase of an outgoing.
 Secret XX
 Cablegram XX

Drafting Section: Far Eastern G2/I.
 Drafting Officer: RSB.
 No. 519 Sent out Dec. 5, 1941

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.

Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

MILES.

[76] Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, presently CO, Langley Field, Va., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says:

On 7 Dec 1941 and for about one year preceeding I was G2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established, for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Comdr. Layton, USN. I told Comdr. Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year I had not more than six conversations with Comdr. Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Comdr. Layton before 7 Dec 1941 was about October 1941.

The information given me by Comdr. Layton was my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan, coming to his knowledge, and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 Dec. 1941.

[77] Any information I received from Comdr. Layton, I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Martin.

On 1 Oct 1941 I conferred with Comdr. Layton and Colonel Bicknell who was then Asst. G2, Hawaiian Dept. concerning a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view. I reported this to Gen. Martin. Attached are portions of a letter, written by me to my daughter on 2 Oct 1941, concerning this conference.

I recall the Gen. Herron alert of 1940, which I believe was known to the civilian population, but to my recollection there was no alarm of the civilian population.

EDWARD W. RALEY, Col. AC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, Va.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

[78]

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, 2 OCTOBER, 1941.

Last night mother and I had a few people for dinner at the club. We had Commander Layton, who is Fleet intelligence officer; Col. Bicknell, who is on intelligence duty down town; and Major Meehan from the post—and their wives, of course. Wednesday evening is a supper dance evening at the club. We assembled at the house, and the drinking members lifted a few and then we adjourned to the club where we had dinner and danced a bit. We thought a good time was had by all and in your immortal phrase, it "was a good party."

The reason I was anxious to have these people together was that I was anxious to get Bicknell's and Layton's opinion regarding the Far Eastern situation. You might gather from the public prints that United States—Japanese relations had been improving of late, but somehow, I didn't think so. It seems to me that Japanese—U. S. relations never were in a more critical state than they are at this moment. I don't say [79] there necessarily will be a war between the two countries right now, but I do say that never in the past has there been a time when it would be easier to have one.

I thought I'd better speak to the boss about the matter, so I did, and he made me feel extremely foolish. He agreed with the general conclusion and then, in the fewest number of words possible, he summed up the situation in a fashion that was just about perfect. I would have been very proud of myself if I had had the situation as well ordered in my mind and was capable of expressing it as well as he did. I've never heard anything so concisely and comprehensively expressed.

DADDY.

[Hand written :] Letter returned by Joyce Nov. 3, 1942.

EWR.

[80]

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL CHARLES K. GAILEY

General Charles K. Gailey, presently on duty in the Office of the Operations Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was Executive Officer in the Office of the War Plans Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Washington, D. C. With respect to intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been deciphered and translated it was the customary practice for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury, G-2, to bring these to me for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, General Gerow. They would be given me and I would get them to General Gerow as soon as practicable. I recall that these intercepts were brought to me by either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recall whether they alternated in bringing them I do remember that it was either one or the other as a customary practice.

Specifically, with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941, I do not recall having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury or from any other source. In the event General Gerow did not receive any particular intercepts the evening of 6 December 1941, I am certain that they were not delivered to me as, if they had been, I would have given them to him.

Chas. K. Gailey,
CHARLES K. GAILEY,
Brigadier General.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[81]

WAR DEPARTMENT-
WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL EDWARD F. FRENCH

Colonel Edward F. French, presently on duty with the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was Officer in Charge of the Traffic Division and Signal Center, Washington, D. C.

I have been shown the photostatic copy of the secret cablegram dated 5 December 1941, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. Based on customary practice and procedure, it is my opinion that the message was sent to the addressee for the following reasons: The notations thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" indicate that the message was brought to the Signal Corps code room and was assigned the "#519" and that the message was then encoded with the code room sequence number as the first word in the text of message. The coded text message, original and carbon copy, was then sent to the message center. The carbon copy bearing the time stamp of the message center acknowledging receipt was then returned to the code room and checked with the original clear text message. The Signal Center time stamp date was then placed on the original clear text message, which was returned the following morning to the office of origin.

In the Signal Center the original coded text, on receipt after time stamped, was given a Signal Center sequence number (black number) and then the message was word counted and placed at the operating position, where it received a channel sequence number at the time of transmission which was checked off the operators number sheet. After transmission of the message the operator put his initials and time of transmission on the face of the message, which was later collected by a clerk who verified the "black number" by a check off sheet before sending the message to file. This was a further guard to assure the transmission of the message. At midnight these sequence channel numbers were and still are verified with the distant end of the circuit to assure that all messages as transmitted were received. This sequence check was and is known as a "good night service."

Further, had this message been not received, a check would also have been made by the code room of the addressee, as there would be a break in the sequence numbers of the code message numbers. This system of checking sequence numbers of messages was a long time practice to assure and guard against lost messages.

[82] The loss of a coded message is possible but highly improbable. In fact, on recent questioning of personnel in the code room and Signal Center, and from my own experience prior to 7 December 1941, the loss of a coded message could not be recalled.

I have seen the yellow copy of the message "519" in question, now in possession of G-2, and it is the yellow copy of which a photostatic copy is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Pettigrew.

I have also seen the photostatic copy of the G-2 Office outgoing cable receipts book page for 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross. The entry shown thereon bearing serial No. 4 indicates that the clerk in the Signal Corps code room receipted for the message by the initials "DG", which I recognize as the handwriting of Dorothy Glaves who was employed as a clerk in the Signal Corps code room on 5 December 1941, and whose duties included receipting for such messages.

Edward F. French,
EDWARD F. FRENCH,
Colonel, S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[83]

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL JOSEPH K. EVANS

Colonel Joseph K. Evans, presently on duty in G-2, War Department, as the Pacific Ocean Area Japanese Specialist, being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

For about two months immediately prior to 27 November 1941 I was G-2, Philippine Department, and for two years prior to said two months period I was Assistant G-2, Philippine Department.

There was very close liaison and exchange of intelligence information between the Army and the Navy at Manila. The Army and the Navy each had facilities for intercepting, decrypting and translating Japanese radio messages. Each Service had a machine for the decryption of Japanese messages which were encoded in the classification known as Purple. The types of messages decrypted at Manila correspond generally to those shown me by Major Clausen and designated Top Secret, Exhibit "B". The customary practice of the Army or Navy at Manila was to inform the Army or Navy at Hawaii of intelligence on Japanese information thus obtained. More precise information in this regard as to particular messages was probably known to my Assistant for Signal Intelligence, Major Sherr, now deceased, and may be known to Commander "Rosie" Mason, USN. There was also close liaison with the British S. I. S. at Manila. For example, see Lt. Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, International Building, Room 3501, 630 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center.

I left the Philippine Islands on 27 November 1941 enroute to the United States by Army Transport "H. L. Scott". About two days before I left I received information, which to the best of my recollection came from the British Secret Intelligence Service at Singapore, to the effect that hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent and that large Japanese Naval forces were concentrating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. For these reasons, the convoy of which the "H. L. Scott" was a part did not proceed in the usual direct route from Manila to Pearl Harbor, but went by a circuitous route south through the Torres Strait which separates Australia and New Guinea. On my arrival in Pearl Harbor on or about 15 December 1941, I for several hours discussed G-2 matters with Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and Mr. Shivers, F. B. I. Agent in charge. During the course of these discussions I told Colonel Bicknell and Mr. Shivers of the information [84] I had received and was in turn told by Colonel Bicknell that he also had received this information and at the same time.

Joseph K. Evans,
JOSEPH K. EVANS,
Colonel, GSC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.

at Washington, D. C.

[85] Memorandum to: Lieut. Col. Henry Christian Clausen.

From: Mr. John E. Russell, President

Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H.

You asked me to recall the circumstances surrounding my receipt of confidential information before December 7, 1941, which was so indicative of coming trouble in the Philippine area that I had acted immediately to cancel orders for shipment to that Territory.

My records indicate that on December 4th I telephoned to Mr. C. V. Bennett, Manager of our San Francisco office, and asked him to take steps to cancel all outstanding orders for shipment to the Philippine Islands and to endeavor to stop shipments that were en route there.

I personally received no message on this subject from the Philippines, but I saw a copy of a message dispatched by Col. G. H. Wilkinson (then working secretly for the British Government) addressed to his agent in Honolulu, and he had requested the agent to show me the message. Mr. Harry L. Dawson, the agent in question, is sitting beside me while I dictate this memorandum, and states that after showing this message to me a copy of it was left with Col. Bicknell, Capt. Mayfield and Mr. Robert Shivers, then with the FBI. Mr. Dawson finds that all his records of this incident were destroyed immediately after December 7, 1941.

On December 15th I wrote to Mr. Bennett as follows:

"Thank you for your letter of December 5th about Philippine indent orders.

It is certainly interesting to say the least that we should have taken steps on December 4th to stop this type of business. I took some similar precautions here at the same time, but cannot give any logical explanation as to why I had taken such steps. It just looks like one of those lucky hunches that one gets at times."

I do not recall, exactly, what was in the message that was shown to me, but believe it indicated some Japanese troop dispositions which were very illuminating in the light of diplomatic exchanges then taking place. I do not believe that the message said that trouble would begin on December 7th; but as I told you today the general tone of the message was sufficiently alarming to cause a reaction in the mind of a businessman, strong enough to warrant the cancellation of a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines.

I am sorry that I have no other data that might throw [86] light on this subject; and in the light of what I have said above in connection with Mr. Dawson's files, he is not submitting a memorandum on this subject; but I can say that his recollection of the incident is substantially in agreement with what I have given you herein.

Jer-m.

JOHN E. RUSSELL,

President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.

April 10, 1945.
At Honolulu.

CONFIDENTIAL

[87A] URGENT CABLE RECEIVED FROM MANILA NIGHT OF DEC. 3, 1941

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China:

A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.

2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm).

B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.

C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.

cc. Col. Bicknell

. Mr. Shivers

Capt. Mayfield

[87B] On the reverse side of this document is a copy of the message referred to in memorandum to Lieut. Col. Henry C. Clausen dated April 10, 1945, which was received by the undersigned and copies distributed to the persons indicated in said memorandum, on December 4, 1941.

Honolulu, T. H.

April 16, 1945.

HARRY L. DAWSON.

JOHN E. RUSSELL.

[88]

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS

Robert L. Shivers, presently Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says:

On 7 Dec. 1941 and since August 1939, I was FBI Agent in Charge at Honolulu, T. H.

During the year 1940 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort, Res., USN, Intelligence Officer Hawaiian Detachment, U. S. Fleet. Commencing in the first part of 1941 I developed close liaison with then Capt. Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. Since August 1939 I had close liaison with then Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell, MID, Army Reserve. About July 1941 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept. This liaison with the foregoing persons continued down to 7 Dec. 1941 and after. I held weekly meetings with Colonel Bicknell and Capt. Mayfield. Colonel Fielder would sometimes be present.

I knew on 7 Dec. 1941 and for months preceding that date that Comdr. Rochefort was in charge of the Navy unit which consisted [89] of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. Comdr. Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 Dec. 1941.

Before 7 Dec. 1941, about 1 Dec. 1941, Capt. Mayfield told me he was aware of the code the Japanese would use and announce by radio its war movements and break in diplomatic relations; and said to me if I suddenly call you and say I am moving to the East side of the Island (Oahu) or north, south, or west sides, it will mean that Japan is moving against the countries which lie in those directions from Japan. I passed that information on to Colonel Bicknell, on that date. At no time did Capt. Mayfield give me the code indicating such movement.

On 3 Dec. 1941 Capt. Mayfield called me, asking if I could verify his information that the Japanese Consul [90] General at Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. At that time I thought his surveillance of the Consulate had disclosed this fact, but after 7 Dec 1941 I learned he was referring to information intercepted by the Navy that such was being done in Singapore, Malaya and London. This latter information was given me by Comdr. Rochefort after 7 Dec. 1941. About 2 hours after my conversation with Capt. Mayfield on 3 Dec 1941, the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate & a Japanese person in Honolulu, during which the cook told this person the Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. This was about noon on 3 Dec 1941 & I immediately gave this information to Capt. Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. I was never informed by Capt. Mayfield what use he made of it. Col. Bicknell informed me that he personally gave this information to Gen. Short's Staff at the Staff meeting on 6 Dec. 1941.

On or about 28 Nov. 1941 I received I received a radio from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to the effect that peace negotiations between the US & Japan were breaking down & to be on the alert at all [91] times as anything could happen. On the same day I gave this information to Capt. Mayfield & Col. Bicknell, each of whom said they had already received similar information from their respective headquarters in Washington, D. C.

About the period 8 Dec to 12 Dec 1941, Col. Bicknell showed me a paraphrase copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 Dec 1941, of a radiogram sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn, for the Consul General, through which the movement of the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor could be made known to Japanese submarines off the Islands of Oahu & Maui.

ROBERT L. SHIVERS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

at Honolulu

[92]

AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS

Concerning the paraphrase dispatch to C. G. Haw. Dept., signed Marshall, dated 12 Dec. 1941, relating to signals suggested by Kuhn, it is my understanding that the basis for this dispatch was an Army radio intercept. I received this information from Col. Bicknell. When this dispatch was received by the Army in Hawaii, we had already received a translation of a full text of the message to which it relates. Comdr. Rochefort furnished this translation, after I had given him a copy of the message, which copy was found at the Japanese Consulate on 7 Dec. 1941, and a copy of the Japanese code found at the said Consulate also on 7 Dec. 1941. After getting the copy from the Japanese Consulate of the message, we got the original from the Mackay Radio Co.

Concerning the Gen. Herron alert [93] of 1940, the civilian population of Oahu considered it routine Army maneuvers and was not alarmed in any way, because of the manner in which the alert was handled. It was designed to give the impression it created.

Concerning the Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, dated 22 Mar. 1945, I talked with Col. Evans, in company of Col. Bicknell, when Col. Evans arrived in Honolulu from Manila in December, 1941. I do not recall the details of our conversation. I am, however, positive that he did not discuss in my presence the information set forth in paragraph 3 of his affidavit.

ROBERT L. SHIVERS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 16th day of March, 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[94] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS, WHO STATES FURTHER:

Gerald Wilkinson, then manager for the Theo. H. Davies Co., Manila, P. I., called on me about July 1941 and stated he was the representative in the Pacific area for the Special Intelligence Service of the British government, reporting direct to the British Foreign Office at London; that he had established Mr. Harry Dawson, an English citizen and British Vice Consul for the Hawaiian Islands, as the operative representative of the said SIS in the Hawaiian Islands; that Mr. Dawson would be concerned with no internal matters of the Hawaiian Islands, but would be concerned with developing foreign intelligence information pertaining to Japanese, which information Dawson would get from persons returning to Hawaii from Japan; that Wilkinson proposed to furnish the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, information, thru Dawson, of information received from other SIS operatives in the Pacific area, concerning conditions and intelligence affecting Japan; that pursuant to consent of higher authority, arrangements were made for the receipt of such information [95] by the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, and such information was furnished as proposed during the period from July to and including December, 1941; that the files of the information so furnished include copies of cables dated 27 November and 3 December, 1941, upon which appear my initial;

Concerning telephone intercepts at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, I ascertained during the latter part of November, 1941, that the ONI, which for several years had covered what were supposed to be all telephone lines at the Consulate, did not in fact cover one line to the cook's quarters; I therefore covered this line, which resulted in information as to the destruction by the Consul of all his important papers on 3 December 1941, about which I have already testified; that I assumed the ONI had all other lines covered up to and including 7 December 1941, and did not receive any information to the contrary until today, when it was stated that the coverage by ONI ceased on 2 December, 1941, at the order of the District [96] Intelligence Officer; that had I known such ONI coverage had ceased, I would have caused FBI coverage in replacement.

Robert L. Shivers.

ROBERT L. SHIVERS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, 20 April 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[97] Telegram
Gov Jus
Hoover
FBI Justice
Washington, D. C.

RLS:PB

HONOLULU, T. H., December 5, 1945.

Japanese Activities Honolulu T. H. Espionage confile J. Japanese consul general Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers.

SHIVERS.

Official Business.

[98]

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Box 3, APO 456

In reply refer to:

16 APRIL 1945.

Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

Subject: Action taken on W. D. information concerning possible hostilities with Japan.

1. By direction, the undersigned, accompanied by Major (then 1st Lt.) C. W. Stevenson, met in conference with Lt. Col. E. W. Raley, G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, and the various Air Force Intelligence officers in the Hawaiian area, on 29 November 1941. The purpose of the conference was to acquaint these officers with information contained in a Secret Radio received by G-2, Hawaiian Department, from the War Department, dated 27 November 1941, which advised that negotiations with Japan had reached a stalemate, that hostilities might ensue, and that subversive activities might be expected.

2. The conference was held in the office of Lt. Col. Raley at Hickam Field at 1430, 29 November 1941. The assembled officers were advised by the undersigned of the context of the above-referred to radio message, and it was suggested to them that all practicable precautionary measures be taken to guard against possible sabotage of Air Force installations and equipment.

Byron M. Meurlott,
BYRON M. MEURLOTT,
Lt. Colonel, M. I.,
Assist. A. C. of S., G-2 (CID).

At Honolulu

[99]

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC AREAS

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 958

In reply refer to:

17 APRIL 1945.

Memorandum:

Subject: Search for WD Radiogram No. 519, 5 Dec 1941.

On April 10, 1945, Lt. Col. Clausen of The Judge Advocate General's Office requested the assistance of this office in locating a copy, or record of receipt, of secret War Department radio No. 519, dated 5 December 1941. The undersigned instructed Capt. Bosworth, officer in charge of the AG Classified Records Division, to make the search and assist Col. Clausen in every manner possible.

The following is a brief account of the search made:

a. Master files of incoming radio traffic were inspected and it was determined that no master files of radios were kept by the AG until on or about 25 January 1942. This was corroborated by C. W. O. Knapp who was on duty in the division at that time.

b. A search was made of the AG decimal files and no record was found of the subject radio.

c. A check was made with Capt. Stockberger, officer in charge of the Signal Cryptographic Section, to determine whether any permanent record was kept of incoming radio traffic. No such record was kept.

d. As the radio in question originated in G-2, War Department, it was assumed that distribution in this headquarters would be made to G-2. Capt. Bosworth, accompanied by Col. Clausen, went to G-2 and contacted Major Maresh of that section. A thorough search was made of the G-2 Files by Major Maresh, in the presence of Capt. Bosworth, and no record was found of the radio.

e. Col. Clausen was given the telephone numbers of three men who were on duty in the AG CRD at the time.

As a matter of information, it is believed that a thorough search of this headquarters was made for this radio at the time of the Pearl Harbor Investigation Board's visit and no record was found at that time.

O. N. Thompson,
O. N. THOMPSON,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

at Honolulu.

[100] AFFIDAVITS OF CAPTAIN THOMAS A. HUCKINS, USN, AND CAPTAIN WILFRED J. HOLMES, USN.

Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS, USN, presently on duty with FRUPAC, Pearl Harbor, and Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES, USN, (ret.) presently on duty with JICPOA, Pearl Harbor, each being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN, J/A/G/D, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Naval personnel and records, and that top secrecy is required, do depose as follows:

Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS states that on 7 December 1941 and for several months immediately prior thereto he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT, and was in charge of the radio traffic analysis under Captain ROCHEFORT; that his duties included the daily preparation of radio intelligence summaries for distribution by Captain ROCHEFORT; that copies of the said radio traffic analysis summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941, taken from the file of FRUPAC entitled "Communication Intelligence Daily Summary", are attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof; that he did not maintain or conduct any liaison with any Army officer, or exchange any information pertaining to his functions or duties, prior to 7 December 1941, and, that in this regard, he did not maintain or conduct any liaison, or exchange any information with Kendell J. FIELDER, G-2, Hawaiian Department.

Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES states that on 7 December 1941, and for several weeks immediately prior thereto, he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that the scope and extent of his duties during said period included only the preparation of plots of positions of U. S. combat and merchant vessels, flights of U. S. trans-Pacific planes and positions of Japanese ships based on call analysis; that these plots were disseminated only to CinCPac. Commander Jack S. HOLTWICK, Jr., USN, on 7 December 1941, and several months immediately prior thereto, was assigned to the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, and has today stated to Captain HOLMES and Lt. Col. CLAUSEN as follows:

That he, Commander HOLTWICK, on 7 December 1941, and for several months immediately prior thereto, was in charge of the I. B. M. machine room, was assistant to the principle cryptanalyst, and was the administrative assistant to Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts Nos. SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, referred to in the affidavit of Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT given Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN and dated 20 February 1945, consists of a dispatch dated 28 November 1941 from CinCAF to CinCPac concerning monitoring by British and ComSixteen for a certain Japanese broadcast and, dispatch 29 November 1941 from OpNav [101] to CinCPac concerning Japanese broadcast schedules and, dispatch 1 December 1941 from ComSIXTEEN to CinCPac concerning certain important Japanese news broadcasts which dispatches have been microfilmed and are contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts SIS 25545, SIS 25640 and SIS 25787, mentioned in said affidavit

of Captain ROCHEFORT, consist of dispatch 4 December 1941 from OpNav to CinCPac concerning report of Japanese circular ordering destruction by Washington of purple machine and papers excepting one copy of certain system, and by London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila of purple machines, which dispatch has been microfilmed and is contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1; that the pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in Outgoing Code Book No. 1 and consist of dispatch 26 November 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of communication intelligence analysis, dispatch 28 November 1941, from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of British consul information that Japanese will attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941 and, dispatch 6 December 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of opinion that Japanese consulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system; that the Communication Intelligence Daily Summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941 are included in Exhibit "A" herewith attached and made a part hereof, and consist of a résumé or evaluation showing the results of traffic analysis based upon intercepts of Japanese naval radio communications only, and were prepared for Captain ROCHEFORT with copies thereof disseminated on the dates of preparation, as indicated on the copies in Exhibit "A", only to Captain Edwin T. LAYTON, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer; that on 7 December 1941, and for several months prior thereto, the said Unit supervised by Captain ROCHEFORT did not have any facilities for decrypting the Japanese diplomatic radio messages which required the use of a machine and the USN decrypting facilities at Pearl Harbor did not include a purple machine and the only machine available was one designed by Commander HOLTWICK and covered a Japanese code which was abandoned in 1938 and not used since that time.

Thomas A. Huckins,
THOMAS A. HUCKINS,
Captain, USN.
Wilfred J. Holmes,
WILFRED J. HOLMES,
Captain, USN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Col., J/A/G/D.

at Honolulu, T. H.

Read and approved.

J. S. Holtwick,
J. S. HOLTWICK,
Cdr. U. S. N.

[102] Morrill W. Marston, O7626, Brig. Gen., presently G-4, POA, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, reposes and says:

My attention has been called to the affidavit of Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, dated 15 Feb. 45; and, during the period about September 1939 to July 1941 I was G-2, Hawaiian Department; and had information, that the Navy had a cryptoanalytic unit; during the time I was G-2 the Army maintained a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining information derived from intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the local (MWM) development of this phase of intelligence; it was possible on occasions to obtain information as to commercial cables sent and received (MWM) by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, it being my recollection that this was given to the Army by the Navy at liaison meetings;

Concerning the 1940 alert (all-out) ordered by Gen. Herron, from my observations there was no alarm of the civilian population.

MORRILL W. MARSTON,
Brig. Gen. U. S. A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Col. JAGD.

at Honolulu.

[103] Louis R. Lane, Chief Warrant Officer, presently stationed South Pacific Base Command, A. G. Office, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD for the SW, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Concerning secret message 519, 5 December 1941, I searched for a record of this message by looking carefully through the classified files and journals of incoming messages covering said date; said files and journals being available this date at Hq., POA, Ft. Shafter and consisting, among others, of the following:

Classified, A. G. Binder 1; 370.2 Battles & Reports of;
 Classified, A G Binder 1; 091 Japan;
 Classified, A G Binder 1; 283.4 Espionage;
 Classified, A G Binder 2; 350.05 Military Information;
 Classified, A G Journals (microfilmed) (2) 297 and 298;

no record of the receipt by the Hawaiian Department of this message could be found, although it was the practice to [104] set forth in said journals the War Department numbers of the messages. Such pertinent number in this case, 519, could not be found as having been entered, but the preceding numbers 517 and 518 were found, and the succeeding numbers 520 and 521, pertaining to messages dated during the time in question.

I suggest that inquiry be made of RCA, since I believe from reading the file copy shown me by Colonel Clausen that it came commercial.

LOUIS R. LANE,
 CWO USA.

Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

at Honolulu.

[105]

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
 DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE,
 SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL,
 Honolulu, Hawaii, 22 April, 1945.

Secret

STATEMENT FOR PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE U. S. ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

This statement has been prepared at the request of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. The statement is based on a personal recollection of events which occurred over three years ago, and on my personal understanding of what occurred at that time. To my knowledge, there is no documentary evidence available to support this statement.

The telephone surveillance of local espionage suspects at, or centering around, the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, was maintained by the District Intelligence Office. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, cognizant of this activity, received almost daily transcripts and translations of conversations monitored.

About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO, began a telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building. To the knowledge of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally uncovered by some employees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this information was casually passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On receipt of the information, the FBI agent in charge apparently went directly to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence had been breached by the DIO's having been given information concerning an FBI tap.

When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being con-

ducted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not resumed until the [106] morning of 7 December, 1941, following the Japanese attack.

It should be added that very few of the personnel attached to the District Intelligence Office were in any way aware that such surveillances were being conducted, and considerable pains were taken to prevent that knowledge from gaining any currency in the organization.

Donald Woodrum, Jr.,
DONALD WOODRUM, JR.,
Lieutenant, USNR.

[107] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN EDWIN T. LAYTON, USN

25 APRIL 1945.

[108] Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation being conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941 and for one year prior thereto I was Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My duties consisted of the following: To receive, correlate and evaluate, and to distribute various intelligence matters to designated members of the Staff, and to Units of the Pacific Fleet; to provide Plans and Operations Sections with essential enemy intelligence for preparation of current estimates; to supervise counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within the U. S. Pacific Fleet; to maintain strategic and other plots of potential enemy Naval forces and to keep apprised of the general distribution or disposition of Fleets of potential Allies; to supervise projects concerning aerial photographic reconnaissance.

Liaison with other Government Agencies, including the Army, would normally be effected through established channels, i. e., the Naval shore liaison or representative in the area in which the Fleet was to move or to be based. To clarify the interlocking yet independent status of Fleet Intelligence Officer (myself), the Combat Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Commander Rochefort), and the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Captain Mayfield): Captain Mayfield was the District Intelligence Officer and responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence for all intelligence matters, including counter-espionage and counter-sabotage ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison on Naval matters with other Government Agencies in the Fourteenth Naval District. Commander Rochefort was the Head of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, working under direct orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, but under the administrative jurisdiction of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison in matters of Communications Intelligence. My intelligence field was limited to the vessels and forces of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and I was under the direct command of the Commander in Chief of that Fleet. Were the Fleet to proceed to San Francisco, for example, I would then contact the District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth Naval District, there and conduct any business with the Army or other Government Agencies through that officer.

About 3 months prior to 7 December 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Raley, called at my office and informed me that he had been directed to establish with me an Army liaison and requested all information we possessed on airfields in Australia, Netherlands East Indies, Australian Mandated Territories, and any other Pacific Ocean airports and airways information. I furnished him with [109] all the information was possessed, confidential and secret, including Dutch "Airways Guide" and Australian Air Force "Airports Directory." Thereafter he, or his assistant Lieutenant Brown, would request various items of intelligence material and as mid-November approached, the meetings between those officers and myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, USN, increased in frequency.

By mid-November 1941 a series of intelligence reports from various sources, including Dutch, British, Chinese, and American, collectively indicated that Japan was on the move in a southerly direction. These consisted of Consular Reports, Attache and Agent Reports, Ship Master's Reports, and reports from other Intelligence Agencies that there was a greatly increased movement of

Japanese Army transports, Naval auxiliaries, and Naval vessels southward along the China Coast, with concentrations being seen in French Indo-China and South China. The general tenor of these reports was imparted to Colonel Raley and we informally discussed and exchanged opinions on the general significance thereof. In a period for about 2 to 3 weeks prior to 7 December 1941, as my recollection serves me, I talked with Colonel Raley on a general average every other day.

During the period of about ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, without authorization from higher authority and on my own initiative, I imparted to Colonel Raley certain "Top Secret" intelligence from sources that had previously been found to be completely reliable and from other sources previously determined to be generally fairly reliable. I did not inform him of the true source and concealed its true origin, in keeping with the Top Secret Oath by which I was bound. I explained to Colonel Raley that I was not authorized to give him this information but would do so if he would promise that he would make no copy or written memorandum of it and would impart it only to his Commanding General, Major General Fred Martin, Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force, to which Colonel Raley agreed. In pursuance of this agreement, I imparted certain "Top Secret" intelligence to Colonel Raley in person as follows: One item had to do with an intrigue in Thailand, in which the pro-Japanese Thailand leaders were, by circulating a false report of a Japanese landing on the East Coast at Singora, to get the pro-British faction of that Government to request immediate assistance from British Forces in North Mayana, so that as soon as the British Forces crossed the border into Thailand, the pro-Japanese element would declare Great Britain an invader and call upon Japan for assistance, thereby facilitating Japanese entry into Thailand and an invasion of Malaya.

To my best knowledge and recollection, I told him as "Top Secret" information that we were listening for certain cryptic weather messages to be included in the Japanese broadcasts which were to signal the breach of diplomatic relations or opening of hostilities between Japan and certain powers, namely, America or Britain or Russia. (No such message was ever intercepted or received at Pearl Harbor.) I do not recall positively, whether or not I told him of the message we had received stating that certain Japanese Diplomatic Officials were destroying their Purple Machines.

[110] In connection with the reports of movements of Japanese amphibious equipment, transports, troops, and Naval vessels to the South, in addition to informing Colonel Raley of these reports I informed him we had other reliable information which seemed to substantiate a general movement to the South of a considerable portion of Japanese Naval Forces, including probably some battle-ships and carriers as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. I distinctly recall that I informed Colonel Raley of the special searches being conducted in late November or early December of Camranh Bay and the French Indo-China coast by Naval seaplanes based in the Manila area, and that these planes had sighted Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports, and destroyers in Camranh Bay and along the French Indo-China coast. This search, in itself, was a very strict secret.

Prior to 7 December 1941, I received no information from dispatches sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu by Commercial Cable or otherwise.

I was not apprised of the so-called "Mori" telephone message. I received a telephone call from Captain Mayfield on Saturday evening, 6 December. He said he wanted to see me the next morning at my convenience. I asked if I should come down immediately as I was free, and he replied: "We cannot do anything about it now, as I do not have the material and will not have it until tomorrow morning."

In connection with the Japanese activity in the Japanese Mandated Islands: Commencing in late December 1940 and until December 1941, and subsequently, I made it one of my principal tasks to follow the increasing Japanese activity in the Marshalls, Carolines, and the Marianas, including Marcus. That the Japanese were rapidly building air bases, garrisoning key islands, was very apparent. As Fleet Intelligence Officer, I wrote and disseminated several bulletins concerning this activity and also the organization of the Japanese Naval Surface and Air Forces stationed in the Mandates, for distribution to Fleet High Commands and the Chief of Naval Operations.

When the U. S. Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of certain of the Japanese Mandates in late November 1941, I held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley and furnished him with the latest Intelligence Bulletin

(#45-41) concerning these installations and developments, with the proviso that the publication be not reproduced nor circulated except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and Commanders of the Army Squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway, with the further stipulation that the document be not carried in aircraft. Colonel Raley also requested, and I acquiesced, to sit in on all conferences after the arrival of the photo planes, and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their take-off. This reconnaissance did no materialize due to delays in arrival of the planes. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, apprising him of these conferences concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the Mandated Islands. Exhibit "B" is one copy of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin #45-41.

[111] I do not specifically recall the term "A, B, C Block" or discussions with Colonel Raley concerning it. I believe there may have been conversations concerning a geographical limit beyond which Britain and the Netherlands could not permit Jap penetration.

My only relationships with Colonel Bicknell was having met him at Colonel Raley's quarters at Hickam Field in mid- or late November, where the three of us discussed, in general terms, the world situation and the situation in the Far East, in particular. Normally, I would have no occasion to undertake direct liaison with Colonel Bicknell, as that was carried out by the authorities of the Fourteenth Naval District through whom the Fleet dealt on all matters pertaining to shore-side business.

From time to time prior to 7 December 1941 when Task Force Commanders returned to Pearl from sea, I was called into the Commander-in-Chief's office to give a brief summary of the general intelligence picture at the time in question. I cannot state positively that General Short was present at these times, but I believe he may have been. At other times when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, I was called to present the intelligence picture to them. During these intelligence briefings, I discussed the general disposition, location and activity of the Japanese Fleet and Major Japanese Naval Air Units as was known or inferred from all available intelligence, including Top Secret. I also discussed in considerable detail the Japanese militarization of the Mandated Islands, their building of Air Bases, Naval Bases, and facilities there, with particular emphasis on the Marshalls.

I had no official liaison with Colonel Fielder, as I had presumed from Colonel Raley's remarks when he first came to me and suggested setting up the liaison that he was then representing the Army, as the Hawaiian Air Force was a subordinate Command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. His statement at that time was, in effect, that as the Navy and the heavy bombers of the Hawaiian Air Force were the offensive weapons for carrying out the War Plans, he was directed to establish this liaison as it was felt that the Hawaiian Department was a defensive garrison. I gathered from his remarks that other liaison had been established with the Fourteenth Naval District in accordance with the existing directives for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. I knew there was a specially designated Naval Liaison Officer Lt. Burr USN from Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District, permanently attached to the Headquarters, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Inasmuch as I had no direct liaison with Colonel Fielder, I did not impart to him any of the information that I gave to Colonel Raley. Colonel Fielder did not contact me nor request any intelligence from me prior to 7 December 1941.

I desire to state that being without my files and notes, which I had access to at all previous hearings concerning Pearl Harbor (the Roberts Commission in December 1941, the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor Boards in 1944), I am unable to make as clear or concise statements from memory as might be possible with the assistance of my files, notes, and memoranda.

[112] I have read the various documents shown me by Colonel Clausen, marked TOP SECRET, exhibit B. I did not know of the substance of any of these prior to 7 December 1941 except those marked SIS 25432 and SIS 25787 on which I have written my initials and today's date.

E. T. Layton,
E. T. LAYTON, Captain, USN,
Combat Intelligence Officer,
Staff, Commander U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subscribed and sworn before me on this 26th day of April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Colonel HENRY C. CLAUSEN, J/A/G/D.

At Guam.

[113]

Secret

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 28, 1941.

Memorandum for: Admiral.

Subject: Projected Reconnaissance Flight over Mandates Islands.

1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this afternoon at 1430.

2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, giving the general summary of the installations and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circulation except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders of the Army squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document will not be carried in any aircraft.

3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the MARSHALLS, TRUK and PONAPE was stressed with particular reference to JALUIT, ENIWETOK, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP, WOTJE and MALOELAP.

4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's conference and is working up meteorological data in conjunction with the proposed reconnaissance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of medium shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are considered most advantageous and fog conditions are expected to be best at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that hour has been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective.

5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive armament and photographic equipment from WAKE on the selected day, departures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installations in the MANDATES it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective of the planes JALUIT and TRUK respectively. The JALUIT plane returning via MALOELAP, WOTJE, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP and POKAAKKU. The TRUK plane returning via UJELANG and ENIWETOK. These return objectives being dependent upon discovery or detection at or after first objective, and existing conditions at the time.

6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over PONAPE enroute to Port Moresby was assigned UJELANG, PONAPE and KAPINGAMARANGI (Greenwich Island).

7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences after the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the MANDATES prior to their takeoff.

/s/ E. T. LAYTON.

Exhibit "A"

[114]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

AA/FF1/(25)

Serial 01954

HRK

PEARL HARBOR,
November 27, 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.

2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED.

3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been reproduced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief, and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence.

4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or corrections) during the present National Emergency.

P. C. Crosley
P. C. CROSLY,
By direction.

DISTRIBUTION: (7CM-41)

List I, Case 3; P., X.
Atlantic Fleet A1;
Asiatic Fleet A1;
One copy each to:
FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.

Exhibit "B"

[115]

TOP SECRET

Confidential

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 45-41

CONTENTS

(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS-----	Pages 1 to 12 inclusive.
Major Fleet Commands-----	Page 1.
Combined Fleet and First Fleet-----	" 2.
Combined Fleet and Second Fleet-----	" 3.
Third Fleet-----	" 4.
Fourth Fleet-----	" 5 and 6.
Fifth Fleet-----	" 7.
Sixth Fleet—(Submarine Fleet)-----	" 7.
Carrier Fleet-----	" 8.
Combined Air Force-----	" 9.
Train for Combined Fleet-----	" 10.
Japanese Naval Forces in China-----	" 11 and 12.
(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS, Pages 13 and 14.	
General Situation.	
Air Distribution.	
Table "A" showing distribution of material and personnel forces in Mandates (2 pages to be pasted together).	
Sketch of PALAO (PELEW).	
Sketch of MALAKAL Harbor, etc.	
Sketch of JALUIT Harbor, etc.	

[116]

TOP SECRET

(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS. October 30, 1941.
(10574)

The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and replaces the former report on this subject.

The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below.

MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS

I. Combined Fleet		
1. First Fleet	(Battle Force)	3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons
2. Second Fleet	(Scouting Force)	4 Crudivs, 2 desrons, etc.
3. Third Fleet	(Blockade & Transport Force)	Small craft.
4. Fourth Fleet	(Mandate Defense Force)	1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.
5. Fifth Fleet	?	?
6. Sixth Fleet	(Submarine Fleet)	6 Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet	(Aircraft Carriers)	5 Cardivs
8. Combined Air Force	(Seaplane tenders, etc.)	4 Airrons, & shore based planes.
II. Japanese Naval Forces in China.		
1. First China Exped. Fleet.	(Central China)	1 PG and 3 DD's
2. Second China Exped. Fleet.	(South China)	Gunboats
3. Third China Exped. Fleet.	(North China)	1 CA, 1 CL and small craft.
4. Southern Exped. Fleet.	(Saigon)	Torpedo Boats, etc.
		1 CL, transports and mine craft.

[117] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-war-time footing.

COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET

YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)

MAGATO, Flagship

FIRST FLEET

Batdiv One
NAGATO (F)
MUTSU
YAMASHIRO

Batdiv Two
FUSO (F)
ISE
HYUGA

Batdiv Three
HIYEI (F)
KONGO
KIRISHIMA
*HARUNA

Crudiv Six
KAKO (F)
FURUTAKA
AOBA
KINUGASA

Desron One
ABUKUMA (F)

Desdiv 6
IKAZUCHI (F)
INAZUMA
SAZANAMI
HIBIKI

Desdiv 21
NENOHI (F)
HATSUHARU
HATSUSHIMO
WAKABA

Desron One (Cont'd)

Desdiv 27
SHIRATSUYU (F)
ARIAKE
YUGURE
SHIGURE

Desron Three
SENDAI (F)

Desdiv 11
FUBUKI (F)
SHIRAYUKI
HATSUYUKI

Desdiv 12
SHIRAKUMO (F)
SHINONOME
USUGOMO
MURAKUMO

Desdiv 19
ISONAMI (F)
SHIKINAMI
AYANAMI
* URANAMI

Desdiv 20
AMAGIRI (F)
ASAGIRI
YUGIRI
SAGIRI

Total: 10 BB, 4 CA, 2 CL, 27 DD.

*NOTE: The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major repairs.

[118]

COMBINED FLEET

SECOND FLEET

TAKAO, Flagship

Crudiv Four

TAKAO (F)

ATAGO

CHOKAI

MAYA

*Crudiv Five**

MYOKO (F)

NACHI

HAGURO

Crudiv Seven

KUMANO (F)

MOGAMI

MIKUMA

SUZUYA

Crudiv Eight

TONE (F)

CHIKUMA

Desron Two

JINTSU (F)

Desdiv 8

ASASHIO (F)

ARASHIO

OSHIO

MICHISHIO

Desdiv 15

KUROSHIO

OYASHIO

NATSUSHIO

HAYASHIO

*Desron Two (Cont'd)**Desdiv 16*

HATSUKAZE

YUKIKAZE

AMATSUKAZE

TOKITSUKAZE

Desdiv 18

KASUMI

ARARE

KAGERO

SHIRANUHI

Desron Four

NAKA (F)

Desdiv 2

YUDACHI (F)

MURASAME

HARUSAME

SAMIDARE

Desdiv 9

ASAGUMO

YAMAGUMO

MINEGUMO

NATSUGUMO

Desdiv 24

KAWAKAZE (F)

YAMAKAZE

SUZUKAZE

UMIKAZE

Total: 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD.

*NOTE: There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to *Crudiv 5*.

[119]

THIRD FLEET

TAKAHASHI Ibo—Vice Admiral

NAGARA, Flagship

NORTHERN BLOCAD E FORCE

CHOGEI (F)

Subdiv-----

Subdiv-----

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE

Desron Five

NATORI (F)

Desdiv 5

ASAKAZE

HARUKAZE

MATSUKAZE

HATAKAZE

Desdiv 12

SATSUKI

FUMITSUKI

MINATSUKI

NAGATSUKI

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE—Con.

*Desron Five**Desdiv 34*

HAKAZE

AKIKAZE

YUKAZE

TACHIKAZE

1st BASE FORCE

----- Maru (F)

Minelayer Division

ITSUKUSHIMA

AOTAKA

HATSUTAKA

Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21

AM-1 AM-7

AM-2 AM-8

AM-3 AM-9

AM-4 AM-10

AM-5 AM-11

AM-6 AM-12

Gunboat Division 1

6 Gunboats (Converted Fishing Vessels)

THIRD FLEET—Continued

2nd BLOCKADE FORCE—Con.

SUBCHASER SQUADRON

(F)
Subchaser Division 1 and 11

PC-1 PC-7

PC-2 PC-8

PC-3 PC-9

Subchaser Division 21 and 31

PC-4 PC-10

PC-5 PC-11

PC-6 PC-12

27 AP—Names Unknown

2nd BASE FORCE

----- Maru, (F)

Minelayer Division 17

SHIRTAKA

YAEYAMA

KUNAJIRI

At least 5 other men of war, and 17 merchant ships.

Total: 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS, 6SS, 6CM, 12 AM, 6 XPG 12 PC, 46, AP.

[120]

FOURTH FLEET

HIRATA—Vice Admiral

KASHIMA, Flagship

Crudiv Eighteen

TENRYU (F)

TATSUTA

KASHIMA

Desron Six

YUBARI (F)

Desdiv 29

OITE

HAYATE

ASANAGI

YUNAGI

Desdiv 36

MUTSUKI (F)

KISARAGI

YAYOI

MOCHITSUKI

Subron Seven

JINGEI

Subdiv 26

RO-60

RO-61

RO-62

Subdiv 27

RO-65

RO-66

RO-67

Subdiv 33

RO-63

RO-64

RO-68

Subdiv -----

8 XPG

[121] 4th BASE FORCE

Trunk, Headquarters

----- Maru (F)

Guard Division 4

----- Maru (F)

4 AP or AK

FOURTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-TRUK)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #17 and Ponape Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Kusaie Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Olol Detachment of 4th Def. Force, Greenwich Detachment 4th Def. Force, Mortlock Detachment 4th Def. Force, Pingelap Detachment 4th Def. Force, Puluwat Detachment 4th Def. Force, Lamortek Detachment ----- (Hall ?) of 4th Def. Force.

5th BASE FORCE

Saipan, Headquarters

SHOEI MARU (F)

Guard Division 5

Composition unknown

Minelayer Division 19

OKINOSHIMA (F)

TOKIWA

Subchapter Division 56

KASHI (F)

XPG 561 (?)

XPG 562 (?)

XPG 563 (?)

Gunboat Division 8

Composition unknown

9 AP or AK

FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-Saipan)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #18.

Tenian Detachment, 5th Defense Force

PAGAN Detachment, 5th Defense Force

Survey and Patrol Division

KOSHU

KATSURIKI (CM)

KOMABASHI (AS)

FOURTH FLEET—Continued

FIFTH DEFENCE FORCE—Con.

Repair and Salvage Division

MATSUEI MARU

NAGAURA (MARU)

3rd BASE FORCE

Palao, Headquarters

----- Maru (F)

Guard Division 3

----- Maru

Subdiv 6

RO-56

RO-57

RO-58

RO-59

Subchaser Division 55

----- Maru (F)

XPG 551 (?)

XPG 552 (?)

XPG 553 (?)

XPG 554 (?)

THIRD DEFENCE FORCE (HQ PALOA)

Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, including Air Group #16 and TOBI detachment of 4th Defence Force

----- Detach. 4th Def. Force

----- " " " "

----- " " " "

----- " " " "

----- " " " "

Estimate these unknown locations to be SOROI, HELEN REEF, ULITHI, YAP and ANGUAR).

6th BASE FORCE

Jaluit, Headquarters

TAKUHAN MARU (F)

6th BASE FORCE—Continued

Mine Sweeper Division 16

NAGATA MARU (F)

CHOKAI MARU

DAIDO MARU

IKUTA MARU

?

-----	{ (This may be the SALVAGE Unit known to be in 6th Base Force)
----- Maru	
----- Maru	
----- Maru	

Subchaser Division 5

PC-51

PC-52

PC-53

SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-JALUIT)

KAIKEI Maru

#5 FUKU Maru

----- Maru

Miscellaneous Forces ashore including AIR GROUP #19 at IMIEJI, Jaluit Atoll and probable Air Groups at WOTJE and KWAJALEIN and RUOTTO Is. (Kwajalein Atoll). Detachment 6th Defence Force KWAJALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll), TAROA Is. (Maloelap Atoll), ENIWETOK Is. (Eniwetok Atoll), UJELANG Atoll, ENYBOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll), IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll), WOTJE Atoll—Detach. of 6th Def. Force, UTRIK Atoll—Detach. of 6th Def. Force.

Total: 4 CL 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS, 1 Survey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM, 41 AP or AK.

[122]

FIFTH FLEET

CL----- (F)

The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown.

The Flagship has been reported at Maizuru.

SIXTH FLEET

(Submarine Fleet)

KATORI, Flagship

Subron One

TAIGEI (F)

Subdiv 1

I-9

I-15

I-16

I-17

Subdiv 2

I-18

I-19

I-20

Subron Two

KITAGANI (F)

Subdiv 7

I-1

I-2

I-3

I-7

Subdiv 8

I-4

I-5

I-6

FIFTH FLEET—Continued

Subron Three

NAGOYA MARU (F)

Subdiv 11

I-74

I-75

Subdiv 12

I-8

I-63

I-69

I-70

Subdiv 20

I-71

I-72

I-73

Subron Five

YURA (F)

Subdiv 28

I-59

I-60

Subdiv 29

I-61 (Sank 10-2-41)

I-62

I-64

Subdiv 30

I-65

I-66

Subron Six

KINU (F)

Subdiv 9

I-123

I-124

Subdiv 13

I-121

I-122

Subron Ten

KARASAKI (F)*

Subdiv 18

I-53

I-54

I-55

Subdiv 19

I-56

I-57

I-58

Subdiv 21

RO-33

RO-34

Total: 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS.

*NOTE: The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned.

[123]

CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)

CV KAGA Flagship

Cardiv 1

AKAGI

KAGA (F)

Desdiv 7

OBORO (F)

USHIO

AKEBONO

AKATSUKI

Cardiv 2

SORYU (F)

HIRYU

Desdiv 23

UZUKI

KIKUTSUKI

MIKATSUKI

YUZUKI

Cardiv -

RYUJO (F)

HOSHO

Desdiv 17

ISOKAZE

URAKAZE

HAMAKAZE

Cardiv 4

ZUIKAKU

SHOKANU

Desdiv 3

HOKAZE

SHIOKAZE

NAMIKAZE

NUMAKAZE

Cardiv -----

CV KORYU

CV KASUGA (MARU)

Total: 10 CV, 16 DD.

[124]

COMBINED AIR FORCE

Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs.

Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for great mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups (e. g the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas.

Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings into which the various units may be combined.

SHIP-BASED SQUADRONS

Air Ron 6
 KAMIKAWA MARU (F)
 FUJIKAWA MARU
 KENJO MARU
 (Has been working with the 3rd Fleet)
Air Ron 7
 CHITOSE (F)
 CHIYODA
 MIZUHO
 (Has been working with the 1st Fleet)
Air Ron 24
 KAMOI (F)
 1 XAV
 Yokohama Air Group
 Chitose Air Group
 (Has been working with the 4th Fleet)
Patrol Squadron 2
 NOTORO
 (Formerly with Air Ron 6)

SHORE-BASED AIR GROUPS

8th Air Group
 10th Air Group
 11th Air Group
 12th Air Group
 14th Air Group
 16th Air Group
 17th Air Group
 18th Air Group
 19th Air Group
 23rd Air Group
 Chichijima
 Chinkai
 Genzan
 Hyakurihara (or Moribara)
 Iwakuni
 Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)
 Kashima
 Kasumigaura
 Kisarazu
 Kure
 Maizuru
 Oita
 Ominato
 Omura
 Saeki
 Sasebo
 Suzuka
 Takao
 Tateyama
 Tsukuba
 Usa
 Yatabe
 Yokosuka

TOTAL: 5 AV, 3XAV, 35 Air Groups.

[125] TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET

SHIRETOKO	ONDO	AKASHI
SATA	HAYATOMO	MUROTO
TSURUMI	NARUTO	OTOMARU
SHIRTYA	MAMIYA	SETTSU
IRO	ASAHI	

Total: 8 AC, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship.

[126] JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA

KOGA, Mineichi—Vice Admiral

IZUMO, Flagship

SHANGHAI BASE FORCE

ASUGA	KURI
TSUGA	HASU

Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section
Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai
Nanking Base Force
Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking

CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, OR FIRST
 EXPEDITIONARY FLEET

KOMATSU, Teruhisa—Vice Admiral
 UJI, Flagship
Patrol Division 11
 ATAKA
 SETA
 KATADA

Patrol Division 11—Continued

HIRA
 HOZU
 TOBA
 ATAMI
 FUTAMI
 FUSHIMI
 SUMIDA
 HASHIDATE

Air Group 10
Hankow Base Force
Kiukiang Base Force
Gunboat Division ? ?
 SHINFUKU MARU (F)
 HITONOSE
 CHIKUBU
 Total: 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP.

JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA—Continued

SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR SECOND EXPEDITIONARY FLEET	[127] NORTH CHINA FLEET, or THIRD EXPEDITIONARY FLEET SUGIYAWA, Rokoza, Vice Admiral IWATE, Flagship
NIIMI, Wasaichi, Vice Admiral ISUZU, Flagship	<i>Patrol Division 12</i>
<i>Cruidiv 15</i>	IWATE (F)
ISUZU (F)	MANRI MARU
ASHIGARA	<i>Torpedo Boat Division 11</i>
<i>Patrol Division 14</i>	HATO
SAGA	SAGI
AM-17	KARI
AM-18	KIJII
<i>Torpedo Boat Division 1</i>	<i>Torpedo Boat Division 21</i>
OTORI	CHIDORI
HAYASUSA	MANAZURI
HIYOBORI	TOMOZURU
KASASAGI	HATSUKARI
<i>Guard Division 15</i>	KARUKAYA
<i>Guard Division 16</i>	<i>Gunboat Division 1</i>
<i>Canton Base Force</i>	<i>Gunboat Division 2</i>
<i>Amoy Base Force</i>	<i>Gunboat Division 13</i>
<i>Hainan Is. Base Force</i>	<i>Gunboat Division 14</i>
<i>13 Special Service Ships</i>	<i>Tsingtao Base Force</i>
Total: 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG, 2 AM,	SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FLEET
13 Misc.	KASHII (F) (CL)
	SHIMBUSHU (CM)
	AP
	Total: 1 OCA, 1 DD, 8 TB, 1 AP.

[128] (B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS.

1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently administers, the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating base.

2. Up to the present the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defense Forces ("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls.

3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some forty odd vessels.

4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ—YOKOSUKA) Naval District.

5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet; they have a designated Flag-

ship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship. Each Base Force contains a DEFENSE FORCE, detachments of which are stationed on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE.

[129] 6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN, PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activities at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers and Fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and Patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA; BUTARI-TARI, and BERU).

7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in Table A, there are a number of potential bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be used as emergency bases or may be earmarked for "priority two" development.

8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical disposition rather than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is:

<i>Identification</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Includes</i>
Airron 24	Marshall Area	(AV) KAMOI (AV?) Marn ex-CHITOSE Air Group ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group
11th Air Group	PALAO Area	
16th Air Group	PALAO Area	
17th Air Group	TRUK	
18th Air Group	SAIPAN	
19th Air Group	IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll)	
Air Station (and Air Group?)	WOTJE	
Air Station (and Air Group?)	KWAJALEIN	
? AIR GROUP	TRUK	

The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62-268 planes.

Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.

(Pages 130, 131, 132, and 133 of Exhibit B consist of Table A showing the distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the Mandates, a sketch of Palao, and a sketch of Malakal Harbor. These pages will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

[134]

NOTES TO ACCOMPANY SKETCH OF JALUIT

1. *Aviation Facilities*.—Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of housing twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-ground tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel power plant (June 1940). Eighty planes reported based here (November, 1940).

On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present indications point to naval air Base on Imieji (EMIDJ) Is.

2. *Headquarters*.—Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good bituman and powdered coral roads.

3. *Radio towers*.—Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).

4. *Shore Batteries*.—Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile waterfront street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Barracks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now).

Mobile Batteries.—Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed trailers. 10" searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940).

5. *Government Pier*.—600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of pier (1940).

6. *Mole*.—150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW. corner of JABOR (1933).

7. *Conspicuous* red building (may be red-roofed building) (1936).

8. South Seas Trading Co. *PIER* (N. B. K. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938).

9. *Two buildings* (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from one of them (beaching gear?—small marine railway?). A gasoline storage located near the two buildings. (1936.)

(Page 135 of Exhibit B is a sketch of Jaluit Harbor which will be found reproduced as Item No. 6, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)

[136]

Exhibit "A"

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET RADIO UNIT

Box 103—Navy Yard, Navy Number 128 One Two Eight, % Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

18 APRIL 1945.

Received from Officer-in-Charge, U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit 42 pages covering daily communication intelligence summaries for the period 1 November 1941 through 6 December 1941.

[137]

Communication intelligence summary, 1 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions.

Combined Fleet.—The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM.

Carriers.—The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.

Submarines.—Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up yet.

Third Fleet.—This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE FORCES are still marshalling their MARUS and the CINC is very busy with Tokyo.

China.—The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon.

[138] *Communication intelligence summary, 2 November, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.

Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating periodic despatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees.

[139] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to emanate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent on the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).

Combined Fleet.—Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates, principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.

Third Fleet.—Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report by RATI 66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third Fleet for information.

Air.—A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKU KANTAI". The literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7), while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level.

[140] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet.

Air.—High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air despatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island Radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDiv Collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a message to Commander in Chief Third Fleet.

Mandates.—The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALAO weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an originator. No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.

Submarines.—No activity noted.

[141] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO vxe active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA 44 (unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many despatches passing between the two.

Third Fleet.—Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YOA2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved.

A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section ?) Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several despatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND, TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many despatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lient. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces.

BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Commanders.

The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many despatches from TOKYO.

Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent.

[142] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 November, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force.

Takao-Bako Area.—It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now en route BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in despatches to Taiwan addresses.

Combined Fleet.—A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.

Mandates.—The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active units.

[143] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 November, 1941*

General.—Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which at-

tached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternâte calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bona fide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill." Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area.

Air.—Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings.

Fleet.—Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.

Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.

[144] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 1941*

General.—Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a despatch action to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end and the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included in much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies him as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas.

Fleet.—Chief of staff First Fleet originated a despatch through Kure Radio. Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo-China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted.

Air.—Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval Minister, Commanders of CarDivs, Combined Air Force, First [145] Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some units from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao.

[146]

Communication Intelligence Summary, 9 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second class Naval Stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The association of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China Force is in Tokyo.

One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.

[147]

Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 November, 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.

Combined Fleet.—Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of Batdiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The CinC. Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions.

Third Fleet.—The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine Force sent a message to the CinC Fourth for information of Jaluit.

Fifth Fleet.—One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.

Air.—The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC Combined Air Force is still in Takao.

[148]

Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 November 1941

General.—Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative with most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.

Combined fleet.—The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces.

Air.—CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments.

Fifth fleet.—Nothing to report.

Fourth fleet.—The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.

China.—The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces and bases continues.

[149] *Communication Intelligence Summary 13 November 1941.*

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:

1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN.
4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet.

This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with despatches to the Major Commanders.

The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.

Combined Fleet.—The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that area.

Third Fleet.—Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of change of location.

Fourth Fleet.—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with the Sixth BASEFORCE JALUIT. Several message were exchanged. He appears to be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement report, but no indication of direction.

[150] *Air.*—Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.

China.—The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.

[151] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AINav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today.

1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet, information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.

2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.

3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to AN1758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity.

Combined Fleet.—Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China area in near future.

Third Fleet.—Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?

Fourth Fleet.—No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.

Submarines.—No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.

Air.—One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

[152] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U. E. 9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnay and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv Three flagship.

Combined Fleet.—Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.

Third Fleet.—Inactive.

Fourth Fleet.—Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway, with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement, direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.

Submarine Force.—Little activity detected. It is believed that some submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer

Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made.

[153] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941*

Air.—Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron (formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees in traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed to be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force.

The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research.

[154] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 November 1941*

GENERAL.—Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new form of despatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table.

A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets and general addresses to this effect:

"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:

1. Resolution of House of Peers—(Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.

2. Resolution of House of Representatives—Expressed thanks, etc., to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4½ years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc."

First and Second Fleets.—Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be:

Airon Seven (3 Chitose class)

Carrier Division Four

Destroyer Squadron Seven

Destroyer Squadron Three

Battleship Division Three

Cruiser Division Seven.

It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indo-China Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have thrown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates. [155]

It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuin Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area.

Third Fleet.—Believed inactive in Sasebo—Kure area.

Fourth Fleet.—FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer, CinC. Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.

Fifth Fleet.—Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the com-

position of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus.

Submarines.—Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet Commands continues.

[156] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 17 November, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic has been found going in to Tokyo it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan controlling.

Combined Fleet.—No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Palao Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.

Third Fleet.—Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Palao.

Fourth Fleet.—The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.

Air.—The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.

China.—Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island Sama, Bako, CinC. South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.

[157] *Communications intelligence summary, 18 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TAINOKU, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force.

Combined Fleet.—CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches

to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted.

Third Fleet.—The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or equipment.

Fourth Fleet.—Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit.

[158] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There was been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy Minister sent out two AINavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders.

Combined Fleet.—The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.

Third Fleet.—Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.

Fourth Fleet.—Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appears at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is not confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error.

Fifth Fleet.—Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.

[159] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that the circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.

Combined Fleet.—Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:

MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three)	ENO 7 (Unidentified)
TAE 1 (Airron 7)	AKU 8 (Air Unit)
KAME 5 (Airron 6)	KUSU 7 (Unidentified)
YAWI (Crudiv 5)	SATU 88 (Unidentified)
KENU 3 (Crudiv 7)	KUNI 88 (Unidentified)
RESE 4 (Desron 3)	OYU 9 (Unidentified)
AKI 0 (Desron 4)	KONA 0 (Unidentified)
TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For)	NOTU 6 (Unidentified)
SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For)	NETE 5 (Unidentified)
YOMO 9 (Desron 5)	NSI 3 (Unidentified)
REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps)	SUTE 1 (Unidentified)
KUNO 9 (Erimo)	YAYU 1 (Unidentified)
MIMO 3 (Air Unit?)	MARE 5 (Unidentified)
TUE 7 (Unidentified)	Plus 11 Marus.

This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out—so far there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.

[160] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941*

Mandates and Fourth Fleet.—The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao.

[161] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 November, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several A1Navs and sent two other messages, one to CinC, Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section At Peleliu and Yokosuka. Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon? While the Drection Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station.

Combined Fleet.—CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows:

CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE5 (Cruidiv?), KOO2 (Subrons5) TIYU 66 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (CarDiv 3), RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Cruidiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1(?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure), META 0 (AKASHI) (at KURE) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU2 (?), NARI 33 (CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).

Third Fleet.—CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SANBOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC. Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.

China.—The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.

[162] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:

1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and Southern Expeditionary Force.

Precedence

NIKA-WIWI

2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information Combined and Southern Expeditionary Force Chief of Staff.

NIKA

3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force. Information "SANKUYUTI" at Sama Hainan.

WIWI

4. SUIFITE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship NWA 2, Information Radio Tokyo and Second Fleet flagship.

NIKA

5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure, Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao.

KIU

Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet, Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI."

An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following:

KENU 3—CruDiv 7 Flagship?

HOWI 2—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.

EKE 8—Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.

MUSE 5—Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.

The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.

Combined Fleet.—CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were inter-

cepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway [163] in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For.) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using, and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.

Air.—Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.

China.—CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.

Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area.

[164] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 24 November, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traffic analysis impressions are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something:

- (a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
- (b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage of what appears to be movement reports.
- (c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses.

The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in despatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter.

First and Second Fleets.—Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.

Third Fleet.—Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with CinC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet and Mandates.—Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area.

Submarines.—Comparatively little activity.

China.—Comparatively quiet.

Carriers.—No definite indications of location.

Combined Air Force.—Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. Otherwise no change.

[165] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 25 November, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AINavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete.

Combined Fleet.—Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.

Air.—Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates.

Fourth Fleet.—CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.

[166] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 26 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching AINavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISUZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).

Combined Fleet.—Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at its high level.

Fourth Fleet.—No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.

Fifth Fleet.—The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force.

Submarines.—As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima area. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.

China.—Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.

Third Fleet.—Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from the Sasebo area.

[167] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five despatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days.

COMBINED FLEET.—No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.

THIRD FLEET.—Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama, South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increasing, those occurring today were:

"DAIHATIFUTABUTAI SANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)

"KOROKUKITISIKI"

"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in care of RYUJO)

"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"

There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.

FOURTH FLEET.—CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.

AIR.—An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.

SUBMARINES.—Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.

[168] *Communication Intelligence Summary, November 28, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previously reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NREØ (the TOKYO D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and *IS GETTING RESULTS.*

TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chiefs of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.

Combined Fleet.—No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and

DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO (CA).

Third Fleet.—Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.

Fourth Fleet.—Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.

South China.—SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.

Submarines.—Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two despatches there was no submarine activity today.

[169] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 November 1941*

General.—Traffic volume above normal. The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Hokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two AINavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR FLEET". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown.

Combined Fleet.—The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet:

CARDIV THREE
SUBRON FIVE
SUBRON SIX
CRUDIV FIVE
CRUDIV SEVEN

DESRON TWO
DESRON FOUR
THIRD FLEET
FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE

Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff; Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet.

Third Fleet.—Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.

Fourth Fleet.—Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area.

[170] *Submarines.*—Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.

South China.—CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet.

[171] *Communication Intelligence Summary, November 30, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted largely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of despatches. The number of despatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUs. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI despatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets.

Combined Fleet.—The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was not at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN Army Headquarters).

Third Fleet.—Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway.

Fourth Fleet.—Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Marshalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one despatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

South China.—BAKO active with despatches to Second and Third Fleets, Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with despatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today.

[172] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941*

General.—All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of despatches from one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting

more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending.

First Fleet.—Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First Fleet is operating with the Second Fleet Task Force that this fleet has ceased to operate in a prominent role.

Second Fleet.—This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).

Third Fleet.—Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets, and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China Forces continues.

Fourth Fleet.—No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.

Fifth Fleet.—Nothing to report.

Submarines.—Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship somewhere in this general area.

Carriers.—No change.

Combined Air Force.—No change.

[173] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941*

General.—The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai. ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.

There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance.

First Fleet.—Despite the lack of positive identification, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets.

Second Fleet.—No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.

[174] *Third Fleet.*—Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.

Mandates.—Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.

Carriers.—Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

Combined Air Force.—This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.

[175] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 December 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long despatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine despatches to the same addresses.

The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that Station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means.

There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH.

Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many despatches to the RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.

No information on submarines or Carriers.

[176] *Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941*

General.—Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.

Combined Fleet.—The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker).

South China.—Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.

[177] *Communication Intelligence Summary, December 5, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.

There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits.

A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."

Combined Fleet.—Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either.

Third Fleet.—In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Commander Fourteenth Army abroad RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYONGUN.SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing the CINC. Third Fleet.

Fourth Fleet.—The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio and the RNO TAIHOKU and the Commander Second Fleet.

South China.—SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.

[178] *Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941*

General.—Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.

Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of TOKYO's messages carry prefixes of high priority.

Combined Fleet.—Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.

Fourth Fleet.—The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer.

Fifth Fleet.—This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.

Submarines.—The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is definitely in the MARSHALLS.

South China.—Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending many messages to the Task Force.

[179]

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

APO 958

In reply to:
POSIG-483

27 APRIL 1945

Memorandum: To Lt. Col Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

1. With reference to the message sent #519 December 5, 1941, which you handed me, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief there are no copies of clear or coded traffic of this particular message on file in the Signal Center, Fort Shafter. In fact there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in the Signal Center prior to 1 July 1944. All coded traffic prior to 1 July 1944 and all clear traffic dated prior to 1 March 1945 have been destroyed by burning. There are no records, including the logs, in the Signal Center which would give us any information as to whether or not this message was received at Fort Shafter. Search and inquiries have been made within the Signal Center as to whether this message had been received and they have been negative.

2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances concerning intercept numbered Army 8007 and dated 2 December 1941. The procedure with respect to said intercept at the time stated was as follows:

Search has been made as to whether such intercepts were intercepted by the Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted to Washington. As to whether they were intercepted, I have this to report:

There are at this time, no records in the Hawaiian Department to show whether or not these intercepts were made by MS-5. The fact that Washington gives an intercept date-time group tends to show that the intercept was made by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's personal sign is an indication to the contrary.

As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have this to report:

Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to Washington via air-mail were handled as follows; On the day following the date of intercept each message was given a logsheet number and entered on an index sheet. The entire lot of air-mail traffic for that particular date was then fastened together to await the next scheduled departure of the Clipper. Upon notification of the impending departure of the Clipper all accumulated air-mail traffic together with a letter of transmittal and a classified document receipt was taken to the classified files section of the Department Signal Office for packaging and was then forwarded to the classified files section of the Department AGO.

[189] The AGO forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the outgoing Clipper. The Clipper departed for the mainland approximately once each week, but this schedule was frequently interrupted because of weather conditions. It is known that this traffic was at times forwarded by ship because of the long delayed departure of a Clipper. The only messages transmitted to Washington by radio were those specially selected in accordance with instructions from the Chief Signal Officer. The message in question was not within the first priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been included in the special instructions.

My search in this regard included:

A search of all Signal Intelligence files including Communication Service, Central Pacific Base Command and Monitor Station #5. Such records as have been found pertaining to the assigned mission of Monitor Station #5 at the time in question show that this station was intercepting traffic between Japan, Asia and Europe.

In this connection I inquired of Washington on 14 April 1945 concerning the originals of intercepts, which I understood are or should be on file in Washington, and received this information.

"Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving operator's sign does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet number 014037 appears on traffic and listed on log forwarded under signature of C. A. Powell. Intercept time shows 0707 on December 2, 1941".

A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located and no receipts for traffic forwarded are available previous to 1943.

3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I previously made relating to the commercial scrambled phone between Honolulu and the mainland, we did

not monitor the commercial radiotelephone. Previous to December 1937 inverters were used on the Trans-Pacific radiophones circuit between Honolulu and the mainland. The same type inverters were used on the radiophone circuit between Tokyo and San Francisco. Because these inverters were of the same type and design Tokyo could monitor the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit. In December 1937 a new San Francisco-Honolulu radiophone circuit was commissioned using a new type of privacy which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this installation there were only two such A-3 privacy built; one for the Honolulu terminal and one for the San Francisco terminal. This type of privacy is much more complicated and furnished much more secrecy than the previous old inverters. The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu circuit as the A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit.

Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-San Francisco circuit the Tokyo technical operator asked the Honolulu technical operator what kind of a new inverter was in use on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit as he was not able to understand the conversation.

[181] Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment had just been installed and the only person who knew how this privacy worked was the Bell Laboratory engineer who had just made the installation. This was proof that Tokyo had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San Francisco radiophone circuit.

C. A. Powell,

C. A. POWELL,

Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Signal Officer.

At Honolulu

TOP SECRET

[182]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
RADIO UNIT

COMMANDANT, NAVY 128
% Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

JSH/rec
EF37/A6(1)
Serial Z-4225
Top Secret

27 APRIL 1945.

Memorandum to Lieut. Colonel H. C. Clausen.

Subject: Information.

1. I regret that results of search for amplifying information on the subject we discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite disappointing.

2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks given) Comdr. F. R. Biard, USN, Comdr. J. R. Bromley, USN, Comdr. A. Cole, USN, and Comdr. G. M. Slonim, USN. In charge of the radio station at the time was Lieutenant Lankford

3. Comdr. Cole is the only officer currently present and available for questioning. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program issued by the Japan Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District Intelligence Office and used as a basic list. A few other frequencies were found by searching, but in practically all cases, they were merely duplicate transmissions of the listed broadcasts. Generally speaking, there were seldom more than three or more programs of the character being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases, split-phone watches were used.

4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese Government Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular attention devoted to those scheduled on the hour and half hour, which usually contained weather information.

5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from this monitoring at any time during the period under consideration. The monitoring watch was naturally secured immediately after it became obviously redundant.

J. S. Holtwick, Jr.,

J. S. HOLTWICK, Jr.,

Commander, U. S. Navy,

By Direction.

At Honolulu

[183]

AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE EMANUEL, USN

Theodore Emanuel, USN, presently under orders to CNO, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, deposes and says:

Prior to 7 Dec. 1941, and for over 4 years, I was assigned to the District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District. About the year 1938 I became acquainted with Col. George W. Bicknell. When Col. Bicknell was called to active duty, about 1940 or 1941 (TE), I discussed with him and Lt. Col. Muerlott (TE) matters of mutual concern relating to the Army and Navy intelligence activities. It is my understanding that [184] Col. Bicknell was cognizant of my functions and activities. These included the obtaining of the telephone conversations originating in and going to (TE) the Japanese Consulate and persons therein (TE) at Honolulu. Such conversations were obtained by me during the period from January 1941 to and including 7 December 1941 by means of covering some 5 or 6 lines. My procedure was to have these conversations recorded, translated and reported to the District Intelligence Officer. These reports were written. This traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and out telephone calls a day. The translator was Comdr. (TE) Denzel Carr, USNR.

THEODORE EMANUEL
Chief Ships Clerk, U. S. N.

Subscribed & sworn to before me, 17 April 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

TOP SECRET

[185]

AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
RICHARD K. SUTHERLAND

Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, presently Chief of Staff, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Areas, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of Staff, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. To the best of my recollection, I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except possibly some of those relating to the negotiations at Washington, D. C., of Kurusu. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing message. I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the headquarters.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence; other than it appears to have been disseminated by a Major Gerald Wilkinson, British Army, who had liaison status with the headquarters and, as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel) Willoughby, ACofS, G-2.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the Signal Intelligence Service officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE.

Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were reports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and departures of ships in Manila Harbor.

Hq. USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra information. All dissemination was effected through Signal Intelligence Service channels.

R. K. SUTHERLAND.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of May 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD

at Manila, P. I.

TOP SECRET

[186] AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, presently Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding General, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq. USAFFE.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the hands of the Navy.

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of May, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.

at Manila, P. I.

[187] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL C. A. WILLOUGHBY

Major General C. A. Willoughby, presently Assistant Chief of Staff, GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACofS, G-2, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof before, except isolated fragments of the Kurusu diplomat message series. Concerning those which are known as the "Winds Code" messages, neither I, nor anyone else in the USAFFE to my knowledge, received any information as to any activating or implementing message, nor any notice that such a message had been transmitted or received.

Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941, these were not seen by me before 7 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than that it appears to have been disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subsequently appointed Major, British Army, who had some liaison status with the Philippine Department, later, Hq. USAFFE, and as such had contact with me and my predecessors, in 1941. (See Appendix A).

Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the Army in the Philippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The decrypting, translating and processing of these messages were functions of the Navy. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decrypting and translating. Under this system the intercepted Japanese code messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a "purple" machine and other crypto-analytic facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for decrypting and translating these messages. It was customary for the Navy, after these messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq. USAFFE) such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the Army. (See Appendix B). Those which were shown me before 7 December 1941 were handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C., now deceased, who was the Army liaison with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these messages concerned inquiries from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor. No record was made by the Army of the dissemination or substance of this intelligence, and the papers on which the intelligence was recorded have been destroyed.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army did not transmit any of this intelligence to the Hawaiian Department, since the dissemination thereof was exclusively a Navy function.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 8th day of May 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, J. A. G. D.

at Manila, P. I.

2 Encls:

Appendix "A"—Re Col G. Wilkinson.

Appendix "B"—Re Navy Crypto-analysis Service.

TOP SECRET

[188]

APPENDIX "A"

AFFIDAVIT

8 MAY 1945.

The British SIA messages, their purport and evolution and the curious role played by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, in Manila and Hawaii are an integral part of this investigation, in my opinion.

The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bargaining, horse-trading of information and a sort of E. Phillips Oppenheim international intrigue.

Wilkinson married into the Davies family and represented his father-in-law, in Manila, as a sugar broker, for many years; hence, the casual reference to a "Colonel Wilkinson", that appears in the affidavits of Mr. Russell and Dawson, suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously intended to be misleading. Wilkinson combined the convenient status of a respected local business man, with that of a secret agent, reporting to the British Ministry of Information; contrary to U. S. Law, he never registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding, in Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2's Philippine Department, Colonels O'Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took over, he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed; the intelligence material he desired to file with me; they contained mimeo reprints of old Jap military data and some sprinkling of China-based reports. It became apparent to me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he possessed his own cryptographic systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became convinced that his main purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army-Navy recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that recognition but that he was and still is an agent of British authorities, reporting thereto and executing orders therefrom. This net of potential spies is world wide; it is still in operation; I employ both SIA and SOE, British, and find them loyal to no one but themselves and the Empire.

My intelligence evaluation of his messages to Hawaii is not high—a horse-trading proposition, pure and simple; I am convinced that this bundle represents not all of the messages sent; the commercial deductions are obvious; Davies cancelled sugar shipments in the nick of time.

Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His Government gave him a military status to protect him, in case of capture. He attached himself to us at the outbreak of the War, leaving his wife and children to fend for themselves, in the Japanese-occupied city; they were promptly interned, in Sto Tomas, for the duration.

We made use of him and his cypher system, to send an occasional message to Wavell and Singapore; he continued to report "home" though his stuff was severely edited by me; the General finally sent him to Wavell's Headquarters, as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher system; he then made his way deviously to Washington and London, where he capitalized heavily on his "status" with GHQ, USAFFE; he was "promoted" to Colonel and attempted to return to our Headquarters, as a "liaison"; he even had the support of the Prime Minister; with a complete lack of military knowledge, such a position had its ludicrous side, except for local espionage, and we declined to have him. He was promptly demoted and attached to duty with the British Office of Information at Washington-New York.

C. A. Willoughby,
C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Major General, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2,
General Headquarters, SWPA.

TOP SECRET

AFFIDAVIT

[189]

Appendix "B"

8 MAY 1945.

In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly efficient crypto-analytical service, specializing in Japanese material; though the Army had notably participated in the development of this subject, the Navy appears to have obtained a lead; consequently, it can be said that the Navy enjoyed on almost monopolistic privilege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security (though every modern nation knows that crypto-analysis is going on), the Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the whole enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in vogue: as far as SWPA is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in Melbourne, forwarded via 7th Fleet D. N. I.; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities, forwards what they select, and when it suits them. The possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection is as evident now as it was in 1941. The only excuse the Navy has is that its field is primarily naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other incidental traffic. This collateral traffic is not always understood or correctly interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion.

The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint, interlocking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest level, with the freest interchange of messages and interpretation.

The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background, beginning with November 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25th or November 29th as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.

C. A. Willoughby,
C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Major General, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2,
General Headquarters, SWPA.

[190]

STATEMENT

Kendall J. Fielder, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen,

Judge Advocate General Department, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about four months prior to December 7, 1941, and had had no prior G-2 experience. The organization of the Section just prior to and on December 7, 1941, was as follows: a small administrative section of one officer, two clerks; a public relations section of two officers and three clerks; a combat intelligence section of two officers and several clerks organized to expand rapidly in an emergency; a counter-intelligence section of approximately twelve officers and thirty agents, known at that time as the "Contact Office", in charge of Lt Col George Bicknell and located in the City of Honolulu. Other than the "Contact Office", the G-2 Section was at Fort Shafter, and most of the personnel had dual responsibility since the section was small and the duties varied.

2. The G-2 section depended generally for information on Japan and the rest of the world on the War Department, on the local Navy Command, and on interrogation of travelers. I know now that some was also received from British SIS. No intercept facilities or other agencies were available to study Japanese communications.

3. While the principle mission of the G-2 Section was to safeguard against internal disorders and sabotage, the Contact Office did prepare for publication certain estimates based on information obtained from all sources. It was customary for all military personnel to channel information to the Contact Office where summaries and estimates were prepared. Prior to December 7, 1941, the G-2 Section of the Hawaiian Department was mostly concerned with subversive matters since there were 160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the Territory of Hawaii of whom 40,000 were aliens. The warnings that came to me were to take every precaution against possible sabotage and that nothing should be done which might precipitate an international incident, and that the public must not be unduly alarmed. I spent a great deal of time the last week of November and first week in December of 1941 inspecting the various military establishments to check on sabotage preparations. Likewise this was done by other Department Staff officers. I also devoted considerable time in the fall of 1941 speaking before various racial groups in an effort to avoid complications should war descend on the United States. Particularly were we worried about friction between local Filipinos and Japanese.

[191] 4. The Contact Office was directly under G-2 but it also functioned somewhat as a special staff section: the Contact Officer, Lt. Col Bicknell, had direct access to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. Actually, this subsection of G-2 performed Combat Intelligence duties although another group was known as the "Combat Intelligence Sub Section". I refer to attempting to obtain and disseminate information of the potential enemy. In reality from the Army viewpoint, there is no combat intelligence unless there is combat.

5. It was customary prior to December 7, 1941, to hold weekly staff meetings, usually on Saturday morning: at that time the Contact Officer presented a brief summary of the international situation while the undersigned usually presented the European War situation. The Contact Officer often reported items of information to me or to the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, prior to 7 December 1941. I informed both the CG and C/S of everything that came to my attention regardless of its source. The three of us were in adjoining rooms at headquarters and were in contact many times each day.

6. My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii.

7. I have been shown a copy of a message dated 5 December 1941, sent by G-2 in Washington to G-2, Hawaiian Department, which directed that Commander Rochefort be contacted for information concerning a Japanese weather broadcast. This broadcast is commonly referred to as, "The Winds" message. I have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt Col Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with

Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer; particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. The contents and details of "The Winds" message were never made known to me. It is possible that Colonel Bicknell may have conferred with Commander Rochefort or others about this but I did not and Colonel Bicknell did not tell me if he did.

8. No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which [192] I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt Col Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt Col Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until after the war started.

9. I have been shown by Lt Col Clausen a file containing information received by Lt Col Bicknell from British SIS and some few items struck a responsive chord in my memory but I cannot remember which if any were brought to my attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to my attention.

10. I have read the affidavit by Commander Rochefort, Combat Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District in which he states that certain intelligence was given to me. I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt Col Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt Col Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct.

11. Col Clausen has shown me a file of messages marked Top Secret, Exhibit "B" which are intercepted Japanese dispatches. I had never seen any of them before nor was the substance of any of them brought to my attention prior to December 7, 1941, except the destruction by Jap Consul at Honolulu of codes and papers which was related by Col Bicknell at the staff conference on December 6, 1941. I gave this latter information to General Short the same day. With respect to Top Secret Exhibit "B", had I been given this series of messages prior to December 7, 1941, I believe I would have recommended to General Short that he place in effect Alert No. 2 instead of No. 1. It is my opinion that if General Short had seen these messages prior to December 7, 1941, he would have ordered Alert No. 2 without my recommendation. It is my recollection that the Commanding General Ordered Alert No. 1 and then announced it to the Staff.

KENDALL J. FIELDER.

[193] Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of May, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.

At Honolulu, T. H.

[194]

TOP SECRET

AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS J. BETTS

Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, presently Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941 I was the Executive Assistant of the Chief of the then Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

In that capacity I was required to have a general knowledge of the major intelligence problems confronting the Military Intelligence Division and with a reference to the Japanese situation I generally obtained this knowledge from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and to whom was decentralized the handling of all Ultra messages concerning Japan which came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton was assisted by Major Dusenbury, GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel Bratton's representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton employed Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized persons in the War Department.

In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these messages, from whom they were received or to whom they were shown. To the best of my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either in written form or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military Intelligence Division during the period in question. I believe, however, that during the period in question Colonel Bratton either showed me or informed me of the gist of most of the Ultra messages which he handled. I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed me of the message which established the so-called Japanese "Winds Code". I further recall inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message implementing the message on the "Winds Code" had been received. I do not recall that he informed me at any time of such a message being received and I further believe that if he had received such a message he would have told me and I would have remember it. To the best of my knowledge and belief no other person informed me prior to 7 December 1941 that an implementing message had been received.

THOMAS J. BETTS.

Subscribed and Sworn Before Me This 13th Day of June 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,

Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

Frankfort on Main, Germany.

[195]

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

15 JUNE 1945

AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH

Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, presently Chief of Staff, SHAEF, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In that capacity and during the period mentioned, I received from representatives of G-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers carrying especially secret information which I later learned included various intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, and were then called "Magic". These were also delivered on occasions for the same purpose to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff. I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what messages were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of distribution or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They were always given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not available to me. I would always give the locked pouch to the Chief of Staff as promptly as possible. If received in the Chief of Staff's absence, these pouches were given him as soon as he returned to the office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered to him at his home when the A. C. of S., G-2, considered the contents urgent. The Chief of Staff would occasionally mention to me matters connected with these intercepts, but I do not recall ever having seen a complete one, nor do I recall specific details.

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the general effect:

1. On 5 Dec 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, after receiving information from Admiral Noyes, then Chief of Navy Communications, that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal rupture of diplomatic [196] relations or war between Japan and Great Britain, and after talking this over with General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of G-2, gave the information to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPD, and asked him to give the Hawaiian Department more warning. General Gerow stated, "I think they have had plenty of notification." Colonel Sadtler then gave the information to me, and made the same request of me. I replied that since the War Plans Division had acted I did not want to discuss the matter further;

2. Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts always in person to the officers concerned; and, when the Chief of Staff was not there, he delivered the pouches to me for delivery to the Chief of Staff;

3. During November and December 1941, Colonel Bratton reminded me that the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be shown the Chief of Staff without delay;

4. On Dec 6, 1941, before Midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for the Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from the Japanese Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations with the United States. (I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these to me it "may have been one of others.")

My recollection of the facts concerning these subjects is as follows:

1. I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of [197] my rather minor province.

2. Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other officer of G-2 delivered the pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me, but to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on duty at my desk in my absence. When delivered to myself or to one of my assistants, our standard procedure was to place it immediately on the desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office, or, in his absence, to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we were so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he happened to be. On at least several occasions I recall definitely that I personally sent the G-2 officer to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in the absence of a Duty Officer.

3. Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of the Intelligence Division who handed them to us were aware of the procedure followed in the Chief of Staff's office as indicated above.

4. To the best of my recollection, I left the office at the usual time on the evening of 6 Dec. 41, that is about 7 PM, turning over to the Night Duty Officer. I am quite certain that I was not at the office after 10 PM. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which I have previously described, and unless the officer who received it were so informed by Colonel Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its contents as neither I nor any other officer of the Secretariat was classified as "Ultra". If he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature, it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.

W. B. Smith,
W. B. SMITH,

Lieutenant General, U. S. A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of June 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Col., JAGD.

at Frankfort on Main, Germany.

[198]

AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUT. GENERAL LEONARD T. GEROW

Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as Chief, War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C., some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, then known as "Magic." These were delivered in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer by representatives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me. Those which I received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2. No receipts were given by or requested of me. When these messages were handed me, no evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional comments by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance on this form of intelligence.

Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, designated Top Secret Exhibit "B". I recall the general substance of some of these messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate dates of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered 23570 and 23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which pertain to reports to Tokio on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also to and coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to the Navy, I assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and would interpret this information in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in coordination with other information available to the Navy and not given to me. My recollection is that there were reports similar in nature which had also been intercepted and disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at ports such as Manila and Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship movements at these places.

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect:

1) On 4 December 1941, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following this, Colonel Bratton conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent on 5 December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."

2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC., informed General Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.

3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843.

[199] My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows:

1) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that if a representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite properly report the facts to his superior, General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and if the matter still remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief of Staff. I believe the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose.

2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive,

prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any sources of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened.

3) I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me.

In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to Pearl Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with Japan or the other axis powers. During this period, however, I did on several occasions receive estimates from G-2, some of which were not borne out by subsequent events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one or more of the Axis powers would open with attacks on almost any of many strategic points of United States or British territory in the Pacific areas. Myself and the members of my staff were constantly concerned with global problems and considerations, involving possibilities of hostile land, sea and air action against the United States by the Axis powers.

I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their respective commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him. The War Department had given him estimates and basic war plans which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan. These pre-battle and battle plans and estimates [200] with which I was very much concerned, were prepared, reduced to writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after a great deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to us for that purpose. They represented the consensus of the belief and expert military opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Department. Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was fully cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his thinking and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No notice ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he would omit preparations against an outside threat. General Short at no time informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement with War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in accord with these estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable to assume that he would have informed the War Department, in accordance with established military practise. I assumed also that General Short's liaison with the Navy was such that he received all information of use to him and available to the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for the War and Navy Departments to send identical or nearly identical messages to the respective commanders at Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. Hence, it was understood that information sent by either Department which would be of use to the other service would be exchanged between the two commanders at Hawaii.

So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 27 November 1941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the Army and Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my understanding that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities, was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, G-2 had available all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not included in Top Secret Exhibit "B."

Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only

a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how it was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not the policy of the War Department to send these messages to overseas commanders. The wisdom of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed information, or if the actual intercepts, had been sent to Hawaii, then the same procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas commanders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii. This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us for the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolongation of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and possible defeats.

L. T. GEROW,
Lieut. Gen. U. S. Army.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.

at Cannes, France.

TOP SECRET

[201] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, SC

Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, presently Officer in Charge, Signal Intelligence Service, Signal Section, MTOUSA, AFHQ, Caserta, Italy, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department. As such, my duties included the direct supervision of radio intercept stations operated by the Chief Signal Officer. In the course of these duties I saw at various times some of the intercepts which had been decrypted and decoded and translated.

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall seeing, at about the time of their translation, the intercept in Top Secret Exhibit "B", numbered 25432. When I saw this message I directed the San Francisco intercept station to intercept all plain text Japanese messages and to pick up the news reports from Tokyo. The station did this and sent the messages and reports in to me. To the best of my knowledge none of these containing the code words were ever picked up. I did, however, see an intercept of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and a person in Tokyo, who I believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts in Top Secret Exhibit "B" numbered 25349 and 25497, but in which the person at the Tokyo end gave to Kurusu the "Winds Code" signal indicating breach of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Kurusu in reply said something to the effect that he was sorry to hear this. The message to which I refer came to the Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept or translation, during the period about 28 November 1941 to 6 December 1941. I think this message also contained some code words translated as "It is a boy." I did not know the meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned was received from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service sent it immediately to G-2.

As additional leads in connection with the foregoing, I suggest interrogation of my former superior Colonel Minckler; also especially Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and Miss Prather. Additional information may possibly be obtained from Colonel Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt. Liparini), and Mrs. Hazel Adams.

ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of June, 1945, at Caserta, Italy.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.

[202] George W. Reuchard, presently on duty at the American Embassy to the Netherlands Government, London, England, being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

I have read the attached sworn statement of Mr. John F. Stone dated July 7, 1945 given to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and incorporate herein the allegations thereof as my statement in response to similar questioning.

GEORGE W. REUCHARD.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at London, 7 July 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[203] John F. Stone, presently on duty at the American Embassy, London, England, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is required, DEPOSES AND SAYS:

During the months of November and December, 1941, and for some time theretofore, I was a Foreign Service Officer and a personal assistant to the Secretary of State at Washington, D. C. As such, I received during this period from two United States Army officers named Bratton and Dusenbury, who were then I believe Majors or Lieutenant Colonels, allegedly representing the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., various intercepts of official Japanese messages which had been decrypted and translated, and which were handed to me for submission to the Secretary of State. These messages were also handed occasionally for the same purpose to Mr. C. W. Gray and Mr. George W. Renchard, who performed similar duties for the Secretary of State, and were at some times handed direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representative of G-2. The intercepts were, to the best of my recollection, complete translations of the deciphered code texts. I do not recollect that except for possibly a few instances receipts were required when they were of course always given. If, however, delivery was made direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representative of

[204] G-2 written record of the visit to the Secretary of State was normally made in his engagement book. I do not remember that any copies were ever made of the intercepts, which were either read and returned while the alleged representative of G-2 waited or returned to him at the time of a subsequent delivery or call. The irregularity in the delivery of and the volume of the intercepts were such as to prevent my recollection of any specific details regarding any one or several deliveries; I thus cannot state the exact time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, when any intercept indicating the possibility of a breach in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States or Great Britain might have been received or called to my attention.

Prior to the servicing of the Secretary of State with the intercepts in question by the alleged representatives of G-2 as mentioned, the function was performed periodically by officers of the United States Navy, presumably of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and it is my recollection that on one or more occasions information of this type was brought to the Office of the Secretary of State by a Naval officer subsequent to the date when as requested United States Army officers undertook the continuous servicing of the Secretary of State. I recollect no statement made to me by any United States Navy Officer prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which I interpreted as indicating the possibility of said attack.

JOHN F. STONE.

Sworn and subscribed to before me this 7th day of July 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
at London, England.

TOP SECRET

[205]

AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE

John R. Deane, Major General, USA, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

During the months of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the War Department, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Secretary, General Staff;

On 6 December 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p. m., and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch for the Chief of Staff;

On 7 December, 1941, I arrived at the Munitions Building for duty at the same time as Colonel Bratton, which to the best of my recollection, was between 9 and 9:30 a. m.

JOHN R. DEANE,
Major General, USA,

Commanding General, U. S. Mil Mission with U. S. S. R.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of July 1945.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

at Potsdam, Germany.

TOP SECRET

[206]

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL RUFUS S. BRATTON

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, O-3726, GSC, presently A. C. OF S. G-2, U. S. HQ., BERLIN DISTRICT, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Colonel Clausen has shown me and has asked me to comment on certain testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board; and on statements and affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Colonel, GSC; Moses W. Pettigrew, Colonel; Ralph C. Smith, Major General; Charles K. Gailey, Brig. General; Thomas J. Betts, Brig. General; Walter B. Smith, Lieut. General; Leonard T. Gerow, Lieut. General; Robert E. Schukraft, Colonel; John F. Stone and George W. Renchard, which statements and affidavits were given by the named persons to Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned.

During the month of December, 1941, and for several years prior thereto, as Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, War Department G-2, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C. various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic radio messages for the purpose of screening and distributing to authorized officials such of these intercepts as were matters of military intelligence value. In the period of about October to December, 1941, the volume of these intercepts increased to such an extent that with the permission of General Miles, A. C. of S. G-2, I utilized several of my assistants, such as then Major or Lieut. Colonel Dusenbury, then Major Moore, then Lieutenant Schindel, in processing, assembling and distributing this material. These were distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. This arrangement and method of presentation to the Chief of Staff and other authorized recipients had been prescribed by the Chief of Staff. These recipients during October to December, 1941, authorized by the Chief of Staff, were, so far as G-2 distribution was concerned, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief, War Plans Division and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. By agreement between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the President was served by representatives of the Navy. The normal procedure was to secure receipts by SIS document numbers from the Aide to the Secretary of War, the confidential secretaries of the Secretary of State, and the Executive Officer of the War Plans Division. The material distributed and thus covered by receipts were usually taken from the recipients by the representatives of G-2 mentioned the following day, and were then burned with the

corresponding receipts, which were given to assure the ultimate destruction of the material. During the period October to November, 1941, the G-2 received daily about fifty to seventy five of these intercepts which were sorted to about twenty per cent for distribution, and which twenty per cent represented such of the documents as had intelligence value.

It was necessary to have help in the distribution of this material so that the various recipients would receive their copies simultaneously. I am unable to recall at this time except as may be hereinafter [207] mentioned, and there are no records to show, who delivered what to whom during this period, with any degree of accuracy.

Concerning the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall a meeting about 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, at which Colonel Sadtler presented information he had received from Admiral Noyes of a possible implementation. There had been several "false alarm" reports to this same effect. In view of an intercept which had already been received and translated, being an order from Tokyo to the embassy of Japan at Washington to destroy their codes, in my opinion an implementation message to the "Winds Code" was superfluous and no longer of importance, since the purpose would be to effect a destruction of the codes. Following receipt of the order mentioned, I verified that the Japanese Embassy at Washington were burning what appeared to be important papers. Colonel Sadtler was, however, directed at the meeting mentioned, to get from Admiral Noyes verification of the purported implementation message in the form of a clear text and in the original Japanese. Colonel Sadtler never, to my knowledge, returned to G-2 with this or any additional information on the subject. I have no knowledge as to whether Colonel Sadtler, after getting the purported implementation message mentioned, went to Walter B. Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, or to Leonard T. Gerow, then Chief of the War Plans Division, and in effect asked that the Hawaiian Department be given more warning. I did not mention to the Chief of Staff the subject of Colonel Sadtler's report, nor do I know that any one else in G-2 did. General Miles and I, by reason of our knowledge among other things of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message to the "Winds Code" indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain.

At no time prior to 7 December 1941, although a thorough alert in this regard was in effect, did I ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code". In connection with testimony of Captain Safford on this subject to the effect that two copies of such a message was sent by the Navy to the Army, it was the customary practice for the Navy when sending the Army material of this character, to send six copies. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with me several "false alarms", but no one in the Navy had discussed with me, nor to my knowledge with any one else in G-2, the message supposed to have been received according to the testimony of Captain Safford.

The intercept mentioned from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington, to destroy their codes and ciphers, was processed for distribution to the authorized recipients.

The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when I was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the office. We assembled and studied the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by ten o'clock p. m. After receipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe was either Colonel Schukraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told there was not, as there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then assembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients. [208] I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff to his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home in Arlington. This was about ten o'clock p. m. The sets of these thirteen parts for the ACofS, G-2, the Chief WPD, and the Secretary of War were not delivered the night of 6 December 1941, but were delivered the next morning, 7 December 1941, with the fourteenth part. They were not given to General Walter B. Smith, General Leonard T. Gerow, General Gailey or General Ralph C. Smith the night of 6 December 1941, nor were they given that night to General Sherman Miles. When I saw the Chief of Staff the morning of 7 December 1941, he then had the fourteen part message, which I had not given him. About ten o'clock p. m. on 6 December 1941, I took the thirteen parts destined for the

Secretary of State and between ten and eleven p. m. delivered them to the night duty officer at the State Department. I cannot recall who the night duty officer was. I told this officer that it was of the greatest importance that the papers be placed in the hand of the Secretary of State at once. He assured me that this would be done. This was the only delivery I made that night. I then went home to bed and returned to the office the following morning between 7:30 and 8 a. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteenth part of the message came to my desk about the time I reached my office. It was processed at once and about 8:30 a. m. it was sent to be delivered to the authorized recipients. I did not deliver any material that morning except the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver at 1 p. m., 1941, Japan's reply to the United States, and which intercept I gave to the Chief of Staff between ten thirty and eleven thirty that morning. The last mentioned message was sent to the Secretary of State for delivery by either Colonel Dusenbury or Lieutenant Schindel. In my opinion the fourteen part message mentioned was relatively unimportant, in view of the other messages which preceded it, especially the one ordering the destruction of the Japanese codes and ciphers and the one ordering the delivery of the fourteen part message at one p. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteen part message was merely the formal announcement couched in diplomatic language of a break which, from the evidence, seemed inevitable. I do not recall having discussed the thirteen parts of the fourteen part message with General Sherman Miles the night of 6 December 1941. In further reference to my seeing the fourteen parts on the desk or in the possession of the Chief of Staff the morning of 7 December 1941, I do not know for certain how they came into his possession.

Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary to my statements here, including among other things as to the processing and delivery of material, and to whom and when, should be modified and considered changed in accordance with my statements herein. This affidavit now represents my best recollection of the matters and events set forth, and a better recollection than when I previously testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and is made after having my memory refreshed in several ways and respects.

RUFUS S. BRATTON,
Col., G. S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of July, 1945, at Paris, France.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.

[209]

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL OTIS K. SADTLER

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, assigned to the Army Ground Forces and on duty at Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board pursuant to Joint Resolution of Congress, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Referring to my testimony on 6 October 1944 before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to information of a possible "Winds Code" execute message given me on 5 December 1941 by Admiral Noyes, I wish to add further that following my second telephone conversation with Admiral Noyes on that day, as set forth on page 252, Top Secret Volume D, transcript of proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or any other person the exact wording of the intercept or information which he had conveyed to me, and as far as I know nothing further was done to get further information from Admiral Noyes. I assumed that the basis of the information before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned me was an intercept which would, according to the standard practice, be transmitted without delay to G-2 of the Army.

I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5 December 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 254 of the transcript mentioned, without getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on my own initiative and without informing any representatives of G-2. I was alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a considerable period of time, and the mounting tension, and the information which

Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Building, and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read substantially as follows and quoted herewith from memory:

"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii—Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."

I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recollection of the drafting of this proposed warning message. I did not show it to anyone. I do not know where the message is now and I made no copy at the time. After I had typed this message I conferred with General Gerow and General Smith, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did not [210] show them the warning message I had typed.

I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe the comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject:

General Gerow.—"I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially so since so many major events have intervened."

General Smith.—"I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province."

I had seen no intercepts and no information came to my attention which pointed to Pearl Harbor as an attack target prior to 7 December 1941. The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to me. I thought that the Panama Canal would be the surprise attack target.

[Hand written: Other than the persons mentioned, namely Gen. Miles Col. Bratton, Gen. Gerow, Col. Smith, and whoever may have been in Gen. Miles' office at the time, to the best of my recollection, prior to Dec. 7, 1941 I did not give any other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes.]

[211] I did not see any execute message to the arrangement for sending such a message as contemplated by the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department.

I had no time urged General Sherman Miles, G-2, or any other representative of G-2, to send any warning message to the overseas commanders, and I deny the testimony in that regard of Mr. Friedman given to General Carter W. Clarke on 13 July 1945.

I also deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the effect that I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes, and reiterate that other than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain the execute message mentioned by Admiral Noyes.

I further deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given General Clarke to the effect that I had collected and had material in a safe deposit box concerning the Pearl Harbor disaster. I have not collected any such material in a safe-deposit box although I thought I had done so. I do have possession of the testimony given by me before General Carter W. Clarke on two occasions, 16 September 1944 and 14 July 1945, which was given to me by General Clarke, and is now in a private box in my home.

Otis K. Sadtler,
OTIS K. SADTLER,
Colonel, S. C.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[212] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES D. HERRON

Major General Charles D. Herron, presently assigned to the Office Chief of Staff, War Department, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, desposes and says:

Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 9 August 1944, I wish to state further that when arrangements had been made for General Short to relieve me as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which command I had held since October 1937, I desired to acquaint him as fully as I could with my experience and knowledge of affairs pertaining thereto. Since he was to arrive and I was to depart on the same ship, there was only a limited time in which to do this by personal conferences, namely, two and one-half days. Accordingly, in order that he might be prepared for his conferences with me, I sent to San Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and material relating to the command, for his preliminary review on the ship's journey of five days. These papers and material comprised in effect an agenda and exhibits. Upon my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I asked him whether he had received the data at San Francisco and whether he had read the papers and material. He replied that they had been received by him at San Francisco but that he had not given them much time while en route.

I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-half days then remaining to brief General Short personally on matters pertaining to the command. This included my giving him my opinions on the officers and men. I told him of my estimate as to the efficiency of the staff officers and, with respect to G-2, that Colonel George W. Bicknell, a Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, efficient man for that position, and that it had been my intention to make him my G-2. I further told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the Navy, the FBI and related sources of information, of the defense plans, of my experience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which I had ordered on receipt of a communication from the War Department, dated 17 June 1940, reading as follows:

"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnish you shortly. Acknowledge."

[213] I also told him of the relations and cooperation which had existed with the Navy, of the civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of the assumption that alien agents conducted espionage for the Japanese Government. I took him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the installations and gave him my ideas of possible attack and defense of that Island.

Following my talks with General Short at the time mentioned, in Hawaii, he did not ever ask my opinions or for information or correspond with me on the subject of command and related problems.

Concerning your question as to whether correct military practice, current in 1941, permitted a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise a

War Department estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commander may and should take whatever action he believes dictated by necessity but must so report to the War Department at the earliest possible moment.

Charles D. Herron,
CHARLES D. HERRON,
Major General, U. S. A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[214]

AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES

MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES, presently Commanding General, First Service Command, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called "Magic", or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.

My testimony mentioned above should be considered in that light, therefore. In the months preceding 7 December 1941, there was available to the War and Navy Departments in Washington, D. C., intercepts of Japanese radio messages to their diplomatic and consular representatives throughout the world. These were intercepted, decrypted, decoded and translated by the two services in Washington, D. C., under arrangements for mutual assistance in this regard and for their dissemination. So far as the Army was concerned, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, who was the head of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch, when I was G-2, War Department, received and reviewed the material received daily from this source. He and his assistants, Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel, screened the material, picking out that which contained information valuable from a military intelligence standpoint. The latter was then distributed by these officers to various officers and persons who had theretofore been authorized to receive them. Those on this authorized list, in the several months immediately preceding 7 December 1941, and to whom deliveries were made by the officers mentioned, included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD. The material was delivered in locked brief cases. The brief cases contained receipts for purposes of assuring the ultimate destruction of the material thus delivered. The cases were returned to Colonel Bratton's office when they had been read, the receipts they contained having been initialed by the authorized officers. The material and the receipts were then destroyed by burning. This intelligence was distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. I do not believe there are any records which would show what intercepts were delivered to whom, nor the dates of delivery, so far as any particular intercepts are concerned. I do not think that any such records were made at the time.

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file of such intercepts, called Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At this late date I am unable to recall having seen, prior to 7 December 1941, any particular messages translated prior to that date, except those bearing Army serial numbers 23570, 23859, 24373, 25322, 24878, 25432, 25138, 25435, 25445, 25496, 25552, 25553, 25554, 25555, 25727, 25545, 25640, 25785, 25836 and 25838. In the latter cases, each of the messages contain something that I recall knowing or seeing at the time. The remainder of the series do not. I do not recall the intercepts, Army serial numbers 25874 and 25877, summaries of which were shown me by Colonel Clausen, nor do I know how these two happened to be omitted from the Top Secret Exhibit "B", in the

preparation of which I was not in any way concerned. I must add, however, that I believe I saw, prior to 7 December [215] 1941, all the messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", which were translated prior to that date except number 25843. My belief is based on the fact that they were of such importance that my officers would have assured themselves that I had seen them. Those which I do not recall simply do not register in my mind after nearly four years.

Concerning such of the intercepts mentioned as relate to reports by the Japanese consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and inquiries from Tokyo as to ship movements in Pearl Harbor, and the division of Pearl Harbor into districts for such reporting, I would like to point out that such messages were primarily of Naval interest and what might have been expected. Of course the Japanese were following the movements of our major ships, as best they could, as we were doing with regard to their ships. Since I knew that the Navy was getting the messages mentioned also, they did not leave any impression on my mind which has endured four years.

Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", and those which related to joint action by the ABCD Bloc, or members thereof, I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement.

The general contents of the first thirteen parts of the intercepts in the Top Secret Exhibit "B", number 25843, consisting of fourteen parts, were known to me on the evening of 6 December 1941. This came about because I was dining at the home of my opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Bearsdall the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to me.

Concerning the intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my belief in the period preceding 7 December 1941, that the Navy was intercepting, decrypting, decoding and translating this material, consisting of Japanese diplomatic and consular messages, at Hawaii, for use in connection with the fleet. I was given so to understand by Naval sources, but I do not recall who told me.

Referring to testimony as to a meeting I am said to have had with Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler, on 5 December 1941, concerning information received by Colonel Sadtler from Admiral Noyes of a possible "Winds Code" execute message, I cannot specifically recall any such meeting, nor having received the information stated. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities. In the event of the receipt of such a message, I was prepared to transmit it immediately to the Chief of Staff and to WPD. The Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for this message since receiving information of the "Winds Code" set-up. It was considered most important and of vital concern. I have some recollection that there were several messages intercepted which, while thought at first to be the execute message, proved on analysis not to be authentic, or to be too vague for definite acceptance as such. It is my belief that the meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, if it occurred, concerned such a message. It may have resulted in the message to Hawaii about Commander Rochefort, on that date.

As to the meeting the morning of 7 December 1941, with the Chief of Staff, according to my best recollection, refreshed from notes made shortly thereafter, I conferred with the Chief of Staff in his office at the Munitions Building at about 11 a. m.

On the general subject of my being alive to the danger of a possible surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, I would like to refer to my service in the Hawaiian Detachment, during 1929-1932, as Department G-3. It was while so assigned that I [216] prepared and disseminated a General Staff study, afterwards disseminated further by General Wells, on the defense of Oahu. This study emphasized the advantages which an attack on Oahu, particularly by surprise, might give Japan. The usual assumption in war planning during my assignment was that of a surprise attack made with little warning in the nature of strained relations internationally, what was called "out of the blue". I remember one situation we war-gamed, that of an attack "out of the blue" on a Sunday morning.

During my service as G-2, War Department, I caused Colonel Warren J. Clear to be sent to the Far East for undercover work for G-2. He made reports to G-2, War Department, using the name of Knight, through Colonel Brink at Singapore.

My attention has been called to the testimony of William F. Friedman, given to Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, as conducting for the Secretary of the Navy the type of investigation being conducted for the Secretary of War by Colonel Clausen. To my knowledge, no records of G-2, War Department, pertinent to Pearl

Harbor, were ever ordered destroyed by General Marshall, or any other person. Specifically, to my knowledge, General Marshall did not ever order destroyed any copies of a possible "Winds Code" execute message. Nor, to my knowledge, were any records of G-2, pertinent to Pearl Harbor and derogatory to the War Department, destroyed. While serving as G-2, I would have known of any destruction of records ordered by any competent authority.

Concerning the question as to whether correct military practise, current in 1941, would have justified a Commanding General of an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, to act contrary to War Department estimates of the situation, such as were contained in War Department messages prior to 7 December 1941, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commanding General was responsible for the successful execution of his mission; he could act contrary to War Department estimates of the situation, but at his own risk; and that custom and doctrine of command would require him to report his action and the reasons therefore promptly to his superiors.

In my opinion the messages sent by the War Department to General Short, prior to 7 December 1941, especially the ones dated 27 November 1941, were definitive directives that a war alert was required by the situation, and that there was an immediate threat from without as well as danger from sabotage.

SHERMAN MILES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1945, at Boston, Mass.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.

[217]

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL REX W. MINCKLER, SC

Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, presently director of training, Camp Crowder, Mo., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to joint resolution of the Congress, and that TOP SECRET is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence Service. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my subordinates in the Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler was my superior. My duties included the direct supervision of the receipt and dissemination of intercepted radio messages. In the course of these duties I saw at various times most of the intercepts of Japanese radio messages which had been decrypted and translated.

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall having seen, and at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25432 in Top Secret Exhibit "B", before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the action which was taken under my supervision to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7 December 1941 there were one or two "false alarms", one of which I think discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the effect that a possible execute message had been received indicating a breach of Japanese and British relations. My opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily contact with Army and Navy representatives who were also on the lookout for such an execute message, and it is my belief that if an authentic execute message had been received, some of these persons would have discussed it with me.

The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of messages by the Army and Navy, one to the other, was to send six copies.

Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel Clausen, Army Serial numbers 25874 and 25877, which appear to have been intercepted on 6 December 1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time indicated for decrypting and translation by the Army was normal and then required for decrypting and decoding Code PA-K2. The Navy time was about four days. The Code indicated was not top priority and involved manual processing. When the Intercepts [218] were received by the Signal Intelligence Service they were sorted into categories of priority, and then after being decrypted and

translated, one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service and additional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI for dissemination.

Rex W. Minckler,
 REX W. MINCKLER,
Colonel, SC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
 HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[219]

AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, presently Chief of Staff, War Department, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I wish to add that, as indicated on page 6 of the Secret Transcript of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising the voting members of that Board, namely, Lt. General Grunert, Major General Henry D. Russell, and Major General Walter H. Frank, participated in a closed session with me from 11:10 A. M. to 12:07 P. M. on 7 August 1944. As indicated on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the Proceedings, during this closed session I informed the General Officers mentioned the character of information which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top Secret sources then called "Magic". I told them, among other things, that the source of this information included intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which were decrypted, decoded and translated under the supervision of the Signal Corps and G-2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source thereof should be made public because it would result in at least temporarily, if not permanently, extinguishing that source. This [220] would have meant that our enemies concerned would certainly have changed their systems of communication and would thus have terminated this most vital source of information which has continued to be available up to the present hour. Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been so compromised.

I did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler, officers of G-2 and the Signal Corps, who were some of the officers concerned with "Magic", prior to or after their testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I personally and secretly informed the voting members of the Board of the existence and important part played by "Magic", it was not until it developed that the "Magic" papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the Army officers concerned were authorized to go into all the details regarding "Magic" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. On my second appearance before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board at length the general problem concerning the method of including "Magic" in the report of the Board and also the availability to the Board of any officers concerned for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret "Magic" phases of the investigation. I informed the Board, for example, as indicated on pages 18 and 37, of the Top Secret Transcript mentioned, that Colonel Bratton was available in Washington for that purpose.

[221] Concerning intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my understanding in the period preceding 7 December 1941 that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was receiving some of this information from facilities available in his command.

Concerning information sent to General Short or his command prior to 7 December 1941, I find that Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2 at the time for General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen that he was shown, about 3 December 1941, a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, to the Navy at Pearl Harbor, in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume "C" Transcript

of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN, which reads as follows:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents."

It is customary and expected that information of this character would be exchanged between the respective Services at Hawaii.

Concerning correspondence which was exchanged between General Short and myself before 7 December 1941, I gave him my estimates in my letters to him dated 7 February 1941 and 5 March 1941 as follows:

[222] "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority."

"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority."

Estimates to the same general effect were sent to General Short by the War Department. General Short answered these estimates prior to 7 December 1941 with replies and sent communications to the War Department which indicated that he was then alive to the danger of the possible surprise attack by air against Pearl Harbor. He participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. At no time did General Short inform me or, to my knowledge, anyone else in the War Department that he was not in full agreement with these War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu, which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan.

The doctrine of military command required that the Commanding General of an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, must not act contrary to War Department estimates of the character mentioned, unless he believed such action to be dictated by necessity and unless he immediately reported and gave full details and reasons to the War Department.

George C. Marshall
GEORGE C. MARSHALL.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of August 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL HAROLD DQUD

COLONEL HAROLD DQUD, presently with the Allied Translator and Intelligence Service, GHQ, AFIPAC, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of the B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section. My duties included the supervision of the solution of Japanese radio diplomatic and military messages. In the course of these duties my section solved and translated at various times many Japanese messages which had been intercepted.

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" I recall seeing at about the time of its translation the intercept in top secret Exhibit B, No. 25432. I recall that when this intercept was translated arrangements were made to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department. My attention has been called to certain testimony of Captain L. F. Stafford, USN, to the effect that I may have some knowledge concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis for this testimony of Captain Safford as I did not have any information of an execute message.

[224] My attention has also been called to the testimony on the subject of 13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the afternoon and evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25843. I recall having seen the message but do not remember the details connected with its receipt and solution. I went on duty on the afternoon of 6 December and came off duty sometime on the 7th of December, the exact times, however, I do not recall.

Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the of the Japanese radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present belief that the average time required was at least two days.

I have been shown top secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The translation dates indicated thereon were not always the dates of receipt. Reference to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service should be made to show the time required between the dates of receipt and the actual solutions and disseminations.

Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection, we did not solve any current Japanese military codes.

Harold Doud,
HAROLD DOUD,
Colonel.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[225] AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT

LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

The average length of time required for processing the messages in the Japanese system known by us as PAK-2, calculated on 19 messages for the period of 1 November to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only messages which were actually published were included in the data on which the average was calculated.

No military systems which were in use by the Japanese Army or Military Attaches previous to the date of 6 December 1941 were readable. Some intercepts were available but not in sufficient quantity to permit the solution of any military system.

a. No written record has been discovered which would indicate positively the exact hour at which intercept traffic was received by teletype from San Francisco by the Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions Building. My recollection is that the first call to initiate the use of the circuit with San Francisco was placed sometime after six o'clock in the evening of 6 December 1941. The response from Station 2 at San Francisco indicated that they had already forwarded by air mail the messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary for them to use the station file copy for preparing the intercepts for transmission by teletype. [226] This preparation required some time because tapes had to be punched for the material to be forwarded. To the best of my recollection it was not until after midnight that actual intercept traffic was received by the Signal Intelligence Service from San Francisco.

b. Since this was the first time the Army had used teletype facilities to forward traffic to Signal Intelligence, my recollection is very clear. Also, I actually helped to operate the teletype equipment in the Munitions Building in both the prelimi-

nary discussions in which traffic was requested and also in receipting for the traffic. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning were present and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions under which we operated were very unusual in that ordinarily we operated only day shifts, and this also tended to impress the matter on my memory.

Frank B. Rowlett,
FRANK B. ROWLETT,
Lt. Colonel, SC.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[227]

AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN

CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

To the best of my knowledge and remembrance the following facts are true:

At approximately 8:00 p. m. PST on 6 December 1941 I was in my quarters at Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco when the telephone rang and the man on duty at the station (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the teletype machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the day's intercepted traffic. It being Saturday night I had only one man on duty and other personnel could not be reached readily. Therefore I went down to the station immediately and began transmitting all of Saturday's traffic using our retained copy, as the original traffic had been air-mailed to Washington at approximately 4:00 p. m. on the same day. Because the following day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor I have always associated the two things in my memory, and am certain that the TWX machine was not used for traffic prior to 6 December and the hours as given are approximately correct.

[228] I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time.

Howard W. Martin
HOWARD W. MARTIN
Captain, SC

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

TOP SECRET

[229]

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY J. DUNNING

MARY J. DUNNING, presently with Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

On 6 December 1941, I left the Munitions Building around 1:00 p. m., the regular hour for the close of business on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and 2:45 that afternoon, I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's office, requesting me to report for work as soon as possible. I fix the hour by the length of time it takes me to drive from my home to the Munitions Building and by 3:00 p. m. I was in Colonel Minckler's office ready to work. I remember the hour because later in the evening when I was asked to report at the same time on the following day I asked to be allowed to report at 5:00 p. m. instead, since I had made plans to spend the day out of town.

I can't recall*being told why we were called back to work, but the general assumption was that we wanted to process traffic without delay since the Japanese Ambassador was in conference with the President.

I was asked to work in the "cage" (a room where machine traffic was processed, so called because of the grille work at its entrance to restrict admittance) where I had not worked for some time. [230] I think that as I entered the room, I was surprised to see a teletype machine. How long it had been installed, I don't know, but I thought it could not have been there more than a few hours, since I often had occasion to go to the door of the cage and it was clearly visible from the door. It must have been roughly around four o'clock that representatives of the teletype company came to instruct us in the operation of the machine. After that we spent some time practicing.

It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because time spent in waiting always seems longer than it really is, and we were expecting traffic from San Francisco at any moment. I remember that I was getting hungry but could not leave the room to get supper since we were waiting for S. F. to call. When Colonel Minckler came into the cage, I spoke to him about getting someone to relieve me just long enough for me to buy a sandwich. This conversation I remember because we joked about my teaching *him* to operate the teletype. To the best of my knowledge, we were in communication with our intercept station in S. F. not later than 7:00 p. m., although I cannot say whether or not they actually had any traffic for us at that time.

I believe I went home around midnight or 1:00 a. m. and I recall processing some traffic during the course of the evening before I left. I cannot say, however, whether it came to us by teletype, or not, since the Message Center had been asked to deliver [231] traffic to us as soon as it arrived. That was traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines.

I did not return to the office until five o'clock on 7 December 1941.

Mary J. Dunning
MARY J. DUNNING.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.

[232] AFFIDAVIT OF LOUISE PRATHER

Louise Prather, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:

To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6 December 1941.

This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual circumstances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and told our unit was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for work at 7:00 a. m. the following morning, 7 December. When I arrived at the office at this unusual hour I learned that the teletype was being operated and the reason for the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic as rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest priority had been given Japanese traffic between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, the transmission of such traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance. This further served to impress the event on my memory.

Louise Prather.
LOUISE PRATHER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.

Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

At Washington, D. C.